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INTEGRATED RELIABILITY AND AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS OF NETWORKS 
WITH SOFTWARE FAILURES AND HARDWARE FAILURES 
 
Wei Hou 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation research attempts to explore efficient algorithms and engineering 
methodologies of analyzing the overall reliability and availability of networks integrated 
with software failures and hardware failures. Node failures, link failures, and software 
failures are concurrently and dynamically considered in networks with complex 
topologies. MORIN (MOdeling Reliability for Integrated Networks) method is proposed 
and discussed as an approach for analyzing reliability of integrated networks. A 
Simplified Availability Modeling Tool (SAMOT) is developed and introduced to 
evaluate and analyze the availability of networks consisting of software and hardware 
component systems with architectural redundancy. In this dissertation, relevant research 
efforts in analyzing network reliability and availability are reviewed and discussed, 
experimental data results of proposed MORIN methodology and SAMOT application are 
provided, and recommendations for future researches in the network reliability study are 
summarized as well. 
 viii 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background 
The focus of reliability theory studies is the overall performance of a system comprising 
failure-prone elements. Typically, the components of the system are not perfect with 
respect to their operation, and their underlying failure structure is assumed to follow 
certain probabilistic distributions. It is therefore important to characterize the behavior of 
the system in terms of the stochastic behavior of its components.  
 
The reliability of a network is its ability to maintain operational over a period of time t. 
formally, the reliability R(t) of a network is 
  R(t) = Pr (the network is operational in [0, t]} 
1 
Another measure often used for the analysis of networks is availability. The availability 
of a network is often expressed as the instantaneous availability A(t) and/or the steady-
state availability (i.e., limt→∞A(t)). The A(t) is defined as the probability that a system is 
operational at time t. It allows one or more failures to have occurred during the interval 
[0, t]. If a system is not repairable (e.g., a spaceship), the definition of A(t) is equivalent 
to R(t). Dependability is used as a catch-call phrase for various measures such as 
reliability, availability etc. 
 Network reliability is concerned with the interconnectivity of various elements in the 
form of network, or graph, as exemplified by telecommunication, distribution, and 
computer networks. For example, the nodes of a computer communication network might 
represent the physical computers (servers, switches, routers, etc.) and the edges of such a 
network might represent existing communication links between these nodes. Each node, 
or edge, or group, or the network can be either operational or failed. Operational in this 
case means that a specific sender and specific receiver are able to communicate over 
certain network links, while failure means no complete transmission path is available.  
 
Not only are the reliabilities of individual components of importance, but also the manner 
in which they are arranged can have a significant effect on the overall dependability 
performance of the system. For instance, Moore and Shannon [19] configured unreliable 
components through the use of redundancy to obtain a reliable (high available) system.  
 
The challenge of determining the reliability of a complex system, whose components are 
subject to failures, has received considerable attention in the engineering, operations 
research, and statistical literature. Networks have become widely used for modeling 
complex systems that are subject to component failures.  
 
The earliest use of the stochastic network model was related to analyzing the effects of 
component or module redundancy in a variety of electronic and mechanical systems [23]. 
More general networks were analyzed later to determine the effect of blocking in circuit-
switched telephone systems. The study of computer communications systems generated 
2 
 interest in networks with both node and link failures, in both undirected and directed 
networks, and in measures of reliability more complex than the 2-terminal system.  
 
In the case of probabilistic networks (where nodes and /or edges fail randomly and 
independently with known probabilities), a number of measures have been explored. 
Suppose a network G is directed, with s and t being distinguished nodes of G. The 2-
terminal reliability Rst(G) is the probability that there exists at least one path of operating 
edges in G between s and t.  The all-terminal reliability is the probability that for every 
pair of nodes there is at least one path between them; equivalently, this is the probability 
that the graph contains at least one spanning tree. The k-terminal reliability of the 
network is the probability that for k specified target nodes, the graph contains paths 
between each pair of the k nodes. 
 
The study of network reliability can be categorized into analysis and synthesis. Typical 
concern about analysis is the computational complexities. It has been shown that network 
reliability problems with respect to a network with general structure are all NP-hard, for 
k-terminal, 2-terminal, all-terminal in undirected networks, and all-terminal in directed 
networks [4, 17]. Synthesis problem focuses on finding a network topology that satisfies 
certain deterministic or probabilistic criteria.  
 
Past research in the network reliability field [3, 8-10, 27-30] has focused mainly on 
networks with perfect nodes and unreliable links. Some of the literatures [2, 5-7, 13-16] 
have also discussed situations where nodes are subject to failures. However, very few 
3 
 publications on network reliability field have been found developing the concomitant 
analysis of both software failures and hardware failures in network nodes [31-32]. 
 
1.2  Objectives of Research 
This dissertation aims to develop efficient approaches to analyze the reliability and 
availability of networks integrated with node failures, link failures, and software failures.  
Modeling Reliability for Integrated Networks (MORIN) approach will be proposed and 
illustrated in Chapter 5 and 7. 
 
Designing handy modeling tools to facilitate the reliability and availability analysis and 
synthesis is also one of the research objectives to tackle practical network availability 
problems where integrated systems are subject to hardware failures and software failures, 
and architectural redundancies are usually deployed at the board level, system level. A 
Simplified Availability Modeling Tool (SAMOT), which incorporates Markov Analysis 
and Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) methodologies, is to be developed to address 
practical network reliability and availability issues, as described in Chapter 6 and 7. 
 
The most common software failure models (such as Jelinski and Moranda model) are to 
be discussed and applied in computational experiments of the proposed approaches. 
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 1.3  Motivation of Research 
The study of network reliability is of singular importance due to its clear applicability to 
computer networks, communication systems, and distribution systems. In certain 
situations, improving network reliability and availability can be more important than 
reducing the system cost, especially for mission-critical systems. Reliability analysis can 
be applied to a variety of practical systems, ranging from large-scale telecommunication 
system, transportation system, and mechanical system, to integrated circuit boards. 
 
Network reliability is characterized by success of at least one path between two specified 
nodes. Most of the available researches assume that the nodes of the network are 
perfectly reliable. However, in a practical communication network or computer network, 
nodes are also subject to failures with certain probabilities thus under such circumstance 
reliability evaluation that assumes perfect nodes is not realistic. The evaluation procedure 
or results are quite complicated and expensive, even for moderately sized networks. So it 
is quite necessary to develop some simple and efficient approaches.  
 
Major network failures are essentially of three types: 
• Node failure due to equipment breakdown or equipment damage resulting from an 
event such as an accidental fire, flood, or earthquake; as a result, all or some of 
the communication links terminating on the affected node may fail. 
• Link failure due to inadvertent fiber cable cut; despite increased network care and 
maintenance efforts, the link between one telecommunication office or computer 
server and the other still fails frequently due to ubiquitous construction activities. 
5 
 • Software failure that can impact a large portion of the given network, and is, in 
general, hard to identify and recover from. 
 
Network failures may arise because the routing algorithm is unable to detect a functional 
route, although one exists. Failures may also arise because the flow control algorithm 
causes the network to be flooded with traffic, resulting in network failure due to overload. 
Both events are caused by software control to the network, rather than by topological 
considerations. In modern information age, software failures, which are shown as traffic 
congestion, protocol deadlock etc, are very common. Nowadays, software is carrying 
various types of information and performs more functions, and software reliability is 
becoming the dominant driver of reliability for complex systems. In a large portion of 
computer and telecommunication networks, software failures cause more down time than 
hardware failures do. Software driven outages have been reported to exceed hardware 
outages by a factor of 10 [11]. Software errors often manifest themselves as network 
congestion that is quite different from the congestion that arises from hardware failures or 
traffic overloads. For instance, hardware failures cause congestion by decreasing the 
number of resources in the network. On the other hand, software errors dramatically 
decrease the efficiency of network resources used.  
 
During the network operation, failures or errors can also be resulted from changes in the 
physical state or damage to hardware. Physical changes may be triggered by 
environmental factors such as fluctuations in temperature or power supply voltage, static 
discharge. Transient states can be caused by design errors in hardware or software. The 
6 
 outages of network operation were reported being relatively evenly distributed among 
hardware, software, maintenance actions, operations, and environment. Table 1.1 depicts 
the distribution of outages from six different studies [75]. 
 
Table 1.1 Probabilities of Operational Outages by Various Causes 
 
               AT&T    Japanese 
    Causes        Switching Systems   Bellcore         Commercial       Tandem              Nortel     Mainframe 
  of Outages       [Toy, 1978]            [Ali, 1986]           Users          [Gray, 1987]     Networks       Users 
 
 
   Hardware 0.20        0.26  0.25            0.19        0.19  0.45 
   Software 0.15        0.30  0.25            0.43        0.19  0.20 
  Maintenance ---        ---  0.25            0.13         ---  0.05 
  Operations 0.65        0.44  0.12            0.13        0.33  0.15 
  Environment ---        ---  0.13            0.12        0.28  0.15 
  
  Note: Dashes indicate that no separate value was reported for that category in the cited study  
 
A lot of research has focused on hardware reliability and software reliability studies. 
Hardware reliability has reached a nearly mature status and various well-developed 
hardware reliability techniques have been widely and successfully applied. In the area of 
software, considerable advances have been made in software reliability modeling, 
software defect avoidance, software fault-tolerance, and software defect removal 
(testing). However, this does not solve the reliability problem for network with hardware 
failures and software failures in a comprehensive way nor does it reveal their inherent 
relationships. Hence a logic step is to develop appropriate approaches for systems with 
integrated hardware and software reliability. A number of efforts [78-80] have helped to 
preliminarily understand the combined hardware-software system reliability.     
 
7 
 Analyzing the hardware and software separately by simplifying the system without 
failures due to interface software might lead to inaccurate estimate of the system 
reliability [33]. A stochastic process is a mathematical model for description of a 
probabilistic nature as a function of a parameter that usually has the meaning of time. The 
set of possible values of the function is the state space of the random variable. The 
property of a Markov process defines a stochastic process for which the behavior in the 
future depends only on the present situation, not on the past history. Markov processes 
with a discrete state space are called Markov chains.  Markov chains are accurate, but the 
state space will explore for large sized networks. Fault tree models can help making 
accurate analysis, but it is hard to deploy in a real network due to the complex topological 
relationship between numerous nodes and links.  
 
A comprehensive approach for network reliability analysis has to be developed for 
practical networks with unreliable components, where link hardware failures, node 
hardware failures, and node software failures coexist. 
 
1.4   Overview of Research 
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 reviews past relevant researches in 
the area of network reliability, including the application of Petri net (PN) and Colored 
Petri nets (CPN) in modeling and analyzing the network reliability. Chapter 3 defines and 
formulates the problem. The most common used approaches for calculating network 
reliability are introduced in Chapter 4. The proposed approach, namely, MORIN 
8 
 (MOdeling Reliability for Integrated Networks) is discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 
introduces the Simplified Availability Modeling Tool (SAMOT), which incorporates the 
Markov analysis and RBD methodologies, to model reliability and availability for end-to-
end network with system redundancies.  Chapter 7 illustrates the MORIN methodology 
and SAMOT with some examples and numerical experiment results of practical network 
reliability problems. Chapter 8 summarizes the research and provides recommendations 
for future researches in the network reliability and availability area.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Network reliability and availability researches have made remarkable progress and 
development in both academic researches and industrial applications. The development 
of telecommunication systems dates back to the last century with the development of 
telegraph, telephone, and the transmission, switching and signaling systems supporting 
them. The forerunner of the internet, the computer communication network ARPAnet 
was originated in 1969 when the US Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA) initiated experiments in resource sharing. Convergence of the two 
technologies has now occurred with the development of integrated digital networks to 
support multimedia applications involving voice, data, images and video. The application 
area covers a vast range of systems embodying traditional telecommunication systems 
and computer networks, is of utmost importance in the development of new and advanced 
information systems and services, while maintain or achieve high network availability.  
 
Reliability and availability for integrated networks are becoming vitally important to the 
global economy. The consequences of failure of the information infrastructure range from 
minor annoyance to major disruption. It is therefore very important to design and 
10 
 engineer high available integrated networks according to efficient algorithms, optimized 
methodologies, rigorous standards, and customer requirements. 
Any communication network, computer network, or distributed systems can be modeled 
as a graph, wherein each node is a switch, computer, or processing entity with its own 
memory and peripherals, and links are communication lines between nodes. Such a 
system graph is used in reliability analysis. Moreover, a fault-tree or reliability logic 
diagram of the system has also been considered. Fault-tree basically translates a physical 
system into a structured logic diagram and is constructed using the event and logic 
symbols. In a fault tree, pre-specified causes lead to certain top events of interest. Top 
events are obtained from a preliminary hazard analysis and usually are undesired system 
states that could occur as a result of subsystem functional faults. 
 
The reliability block diagram (RBD), on the other hand, shows the functional 
relationships among resources and indicates which system elements must operate to 
accomplish the intended function successfully. It should be noted that the RBD is 
different from the system graph that simply depicts the physical relationship of the 
system elements. In logic diagrams, if two components must simultaneously function to 
achieve system success, the blocks representing these corresponding components are 
shown in series, whereas parallel blocks represent functionally redundant components. 
 
In network analysis, the reliability graph and the system graph could be used 
interchangeably. Nonetheless, the reliability graph has a probability of operation 
11 
 associated with each node and with each link. Usually the following basic assumptions 
are used for the reliability analysis: 
• All the elements (nodes and/or links) are always in active mode (no standby or 
switched redundancy) except stated 
• Each element can be represented as a two-terminal device 
• The state of each element and of the network is either good (operating) or bad 
(failed) 
• The states of all elements are statistically independent 
• The network is free from directed cycles and self-loops, as the success or failure 
of branches in a directed cycle or self-loop do not alter the terminal reliability 
These assumptions are helpful in making the model tractable.  
 
Computer communication networks have evolved in recent years to cope with a massive 
demand for the information transmission. The interconnection of severs or terminals is 
achieved by a backbone network. Failures of a LAN (local access network) will affect 
communications for only a few terminals or end-users, which is not catastrophic. 
However, backbone failure is usually interpreted as a catastrophic event. Thus most 
researches in reliability assessment have focused on the synthesis and analysis of reliable 
backbone network.  
 
 
12 
 2.1 Reliability Studies for Networks with Unreliable Links and Perfect Nodes 
Most mathematical models for network reliability assume that the network is represented 
by a graph whose nodes are perfectly reliable and whose edges fail according to some 
known probabilistic model. There are some traditional approaches to calculate the 
reliability of networks with unreliable links only [1, 17], as described in Chapter 4. 
2.2 Reliability Studies for Networks with Unreliable Nodes and Perfect Links 
 
2.2.1 Residual Node Connectivity Model 
The oldest and most extensively studied model dealing with the case where nodes fail but 
links are perfectly reliable is the “residual node connectivity model”- first introduced by 
Frank [43-45]. The network is represented by a simple (no self-loops or parallel links) 
undirected graph G with node set V and link set E containing 2-element subsets of V.  If 
some sets of nodes fail, these nodes and their incident links are removed from G. The 
remaining sub-graph is induced by the surviving nodes W, and is denoted by <W>. The 
links of <W> are those links from E having both endpoints in W.  If <W> is connected, 
the network is operational, and W is an operating state. A reliability function, residual 
node connectedness reliability, is 
 Rn(G, p) = P(network is operational) 
Where p is the vector of pv. If for all nodes, pv = p, then use Rn(G, p) or Rn. If in additional 
all nodes operate s-independently of each other, then 
 Rn(G, p) =      (2.1) ∑
=
−−
n
i
ini
i ppS
1
)1(
Where Si is the number of connected induced sub-graphs of G having exactly i nodes. 
13 
 There is an immediate analogy of Rn to the traditional link-failure model where a 
reliability function for equal link-probabilities is expressed similarly to (2.1) in terms of 
the number of spanning connected sub-graphs having exactly i links. The coefficients of 
the link and node reliability functions can also be defined in terms of link cuts or node 
cuts respectively. It has been determined that calculating Rn is NP-Hard for link failures.   
However, there are special classes of graphs that admit efficient algorithms for 
determining Rn [46]. 
 
With regard to the synthesis of optimal networks, an important concept is a uniformly 
optimal network, which has a reliability function that is maximal for all values of p over 
all networks with the same number of nodes and links. In both the link and node cases, 
uniformly optimal networks do not always exist [47-51]. Furthermore, some results have 
been found regarding networks that are optimal for sufficiently small or sufficiently large 
values of p, paralleling results for the link case [47].  
 
Unfortunately the analogy between the link reliability model and the residual node 
connectedness model is not complete. Indeed the node model has some disturbing 
properties not shared by the link model. 
 
The model defining Rn assumes that every connected residual graph is acceptable  
regardless of its size. Figure 2.1 shows an example that is an unusual graph. 
 
14 
 The reliability function is not monotone. Making each individual node more reliable can 
make the network less reliable. Non-monotone behavior is not presented in the link 
reliability model. Consider any system consisting of a set E of elements and a collection 
of subsets of E called operating states. If every superset of an operating state is also an 
operating state, then the system is coherent. Any coherent system has (by definition) a 
monotone reliability function. The system that defines Rn is not coherent, and is easily 
verified. Consider G in Figure 2.1, the sub-graph G-u-v is an operating state. Let node v, 
which was previously failed, be operating. The new resulting induced sub-graph, G-u, is 
disconnected since v is isolated. Thus G-u-v is an operating state but G-u is not. 
 
 
 
               •    If both u and v fail, the state is operating 
    u        v          •    If only u fails, the state is failure (not  
     n nodes    coherent) 
         •    If all nodes except u and v fail, the state 
    G  is operating 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Residual Node Connectedness Reliability Model 
 
The above approach is traditional in the sense that it models network inoperability due to 
node failure as being caused by node-cuts. This is the direct analog of the link-failure 
model that uses link-cuts. A few other probabilistic models for studying network 
vulnerability due to node failure have been introduced. The concept of using the s-
expected number of node pairs that are connected by a path as a measure of 
invulnerability was introduced by Amin et al [52-53]. This serves as a reasonable 
approach to the study of graceful and catastrophic degradation of a multiprocessor 
network. Since this measure is not a probability and thus not reliability, it is difficult to 
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 understand how the results of this approach can be evaluated from the perspective of 
reliability theory. 
 
An important reliability measure introduced by Fotoh and Colbourn [54-55] contains 
many results regarding its properties from both synthesis and analysis points of view. It is 
shown that it is coherent and does not suffer from any of the defects of the residual node 
connectedness reliability discussed in the foregoing. However, Fotoh and Colbourn 
described a scenario for their model that a specified set K of nodes (k-terminal) are the 
perfectly reliable hosts or targets that communicate via switching nodes with known 
probabilities of operating. This important theory, which covers situations like radio 
frequency (RF) broadcast networks, does not apply to the study of graceful and 
catastrophic degradation of a multiprocessor network, because in many such networks all 
nodes are subject to failures. 
 
2.2.2 Coherent Model  
As the residual node connectedness reliability model has two grievous faults, one might 
initially consider that an appropriate model could be obtained by a revision of the residual 
node connectedness reliability model in which only connected sub-graphs of order of at 
least k are defined as operating states. Such a revision corrects the fault that small-
connected sub-graphs are considered to be operating states. However, there are two 
obvious objections to the adoption of this particular revision: a). It is still not coherent in 
general; b). More importantly, from the standpoint of multiprocessor networks, there is 
no need to require that every collection of more that k nodes induce a connected sub-
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 graph. The reasonable requirement is to insist that the sub-graph induced by surviving 
nodes contain a component having at least k nodes. 
 
Boesch et al [23] proposed a new coherent model for the problem of obtaining 
appropriate models for network reliability when the nodes rather than the links are 
subject to failure. For the application of reliability theory to multiprocessor networks, an 
operating state is defined as any collection of surviving nodes that induces a sub-graph 
that contains at least 1 component having k or more nodes. The properties of this model 
are considered under the additional probabilistic assumption that the nodes fail s-
independently of each other, all with probability p. This is the k-node operating 
component reliability and denoted by, as appropriate Roc(k)(G, p), Roc(k)(G), Roc(k). 
 
The model properties can be observed as, 
Roc(1)(G, p) = 1 – (1-p)n  
for every G and all p, and is trivial. Thus they concentrate on Roc(k)(G, p) for k ≥ 2.  
Roc(k)(G, p) = ∑  
=
−−
n
i
inik
i ppGA
1
)( )1()(
Aj(k)(G) ≡ number of j node induced sub-graphs of G which contain a  
    component having at least k nodes. 
  Aj(k)(G) = 0 for j < k, 
  Aj(k)(G) = , for j ≥ max(k, n-k(G) + 1) 



j
n
  Ak(k)(G) = Sk(G),     (*) 
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   Aj(k)(G) ≥ Sj(G), for k+1 ≤ j ≤ n 
The equation (*) shows that the computation of the k node operating component 
reliability is NP-hard. Indeed if polynomial algorithms exist to calculate Roc(G) for each  
1 ≤ k ≤ n and each 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, then each Ak(k)(G) can be calculated in polynomial time. 
However, this means each Sk(G) and therefore Rn(G) can be calculated on polynomial 
time. But the computation of Rn(G) is NP-hard, hence the calculation of Roc(k)(G) for all 
NP-hard. 
 
2.3 Reliability Studies for Networks with Unreliable Links and Unreliable Nodes 
In a practical telecommunication or computer network, each component of the network is 
subject to failure. There have been a few approaches proposed to analyze and evaluate 
the network reliability, considering the node failures [2, 6-10, 13-15]. 
 
The methods to evaluate reliability of this type of networks can be classified as explicit or 
implicit. The explicit has two steps: firstly a symbolic reliability expression presuming 
perfect nodes is derived, then a special method such as AGM [2] or NPR/T [7] is applied 
explicitly to the resultant expression to compensate for unreliable nodes. With implicit 
method, it is unnecessary to apply a special method to account for node failures; the 
procedure for computing the effect of unreliable nodes is directly embedded into the 
algorithm and hence it directly computes the reliability expression with unreliable nodes. 
For instance, ENR/KW [6], TPR/NF [13] and KHR [14] are typical implicit methods to 
directly obtain the reliability of networks with node failures. 
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 2.3.1 AGM Method 
To account for node failures, the first and most commonly used method is presented by 
Aggarwal, Gupta, Misra (AGM). AGM approach has been rigorously proved as a 
corollary of the general theorem on complex system decomposition. There are some other 
more efficient algorithms derived from it. However, the computational time of this 
method increases exponentially with the number of links.  
 
The AGM method considers each link in the network (with link-failure and node-failure 
probability) as a series combination of a perfect node and the link with modified 
reliability, as shown in the following figure,  
 
     Vi           Ej  
 
Figure 2.2 Modified Reliability for A Directed Network 
 
In a directed network showed above, the reliability for node i is αi, the reliability for link 
j is βj, the modified reliability for link j is βj’ = αiβj. 
 
 
Vi            Ej      Vk 
 
Figure 2.3 Modified Reliability for An Undirected Network 
 
In the interconnecting network, a link can be traversed in both directions. The reliability 
for node i is αi, the reliability for node k is αk, the reliability for link j is βj, the modified 
reliability for link j is βj’ = αiαkβj. 
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 As a result of the substitution, a particular αi could appear in a product term more than 
once. It is necessary to apply an operator to each of these product terms as 
][][ ∏=∏ ∗
i
i
i
c
i
i αα       
where ci is the multiplicity of αi. After the traversing, all the nodes can be regarded as 
perfectly reliable and any algorithms for perfect node networks can be used to derive the 
reliability.  
The AGM method expands each term of the reliability expression derived from perfect 
nodes and replaces the variables by functions of nodes and link variables. After this 
substitution, Boolean simplification might be needed. Unfortunately the computing time 
and cost increase exponentially with the number of links. Furthermore, the use of 
symbolic calculations rather than direct numerical ones can require prohibitively large 
storage.  
 
2.3.2 NPR/T Method 
Torrieri [7] proposed the NPR/T method for calculation of Node-Pair Reliability for large 
networks with unreliable nodes. In general, NPR/T is much simpler, more direct, and 
more rigorously derived than AGM, and can compute the same algorithms as AGM. With 
NPR/T, a set of definite concise formulas is used to capture the relationships between a 
node and its associated directed links. Therefore the cost of this method rises linearly 
with the number of links. 
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 For undirected networks, NPR/T should transform the original undirected network into an 
equivalent directed network wherein each undirected link is replaced with two directed 
links in anti-parallel; however, such transformation generates s-dependent events in the 
reliability computation formula and hence, can yield incorrect results for some undirected 
cases. 
 
2.3.3 ENR/KW Method 
Based on the concept of network partition, Ke and Wang [6] explored some simple 
efficient techniques to handle the unreliable nodes, for directly computing the network 
reliability instead of using any compensating method. The basic idea of ENR/KW is to 
partition the network directly into a set of smaller disjoint subnetworks by only 
considering link elements as if all nodes are perfect. Each disjoint subnetwork is 
generated by maintaining a specific directed graph structure to consider the effect of 
imperfect nodes. Therefore, the reliability expression for imperfect nodes can be obtained 
directly from the disjoint subnetwork and the specific directed graph. 
 
2.4 Software Models 
 
2.4.1 Software Reliability 
An important quality attribute of a network is the degrees to which it can be relied on 
perform its intended function. Until 1960’s, attention was almost solely on the hardware 
related research. In the early 1970’s software started becoming a matter of concern, 
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 primarily due to a continuing increase in the cost of software relative to hardware, in both 
development and the operation phases of the system. 
 
Since software is produced by human beings in a large extent, the finished product is 
often imperfect in the sense that a discrepancy exists between what the software can do 
versus that the user or the environment wants it to do. The computing environment refers 
to the physical machine, operating system, compiler and translator utilities, etc.  These 
discrepancies are called software faults. Basically, software faults can be attributed to 
ignorance of the user requirements, to ignorance of rules of the computing environment, 
to poor communication of software requirements between the user and the programmer, 
or poor documentation of the software by the programmer. Even if we know that 
software contains faults, we generally do not know their exact identity. 
 
There are two approaches to indicate the existence of software faults: program proving 
and program testing. Program proving is formal and mathematical while program testing 
is more practical and heuristic. The approach taken in program proving is to construct a 
finite sequence of logical statements ending in the statement, usually the output 
specification statement, to be proved. Each of the logical statements is an axiom or is a 
statement derived from earlier statements by the application of an inference rule. Program 
proving by using inference rules is known as the inductive assertion method [56]. Other 
work on program proving is on the symbolic execution method that is the basis of some 
automatic program verifiers. Despite the formalism and mathematical exactness, program 
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 proving is still imperfect tool for verifying program correctness. It is showed several 
programs that were proved to be correct but still contained faults [57]. 
However the faults were due to failures in defining what exactly to prove and were not 
failures of the mechanics of the proof itself.  
 
Program testing is the symbolic or physical execution of a set of test cases with the intent 
of exposing embedded faults in the program. A given testing strategy may be good for 
exposing certain kinds of faults but not for all possible kinds of faults in a program. An 
advantage of testing is that it can provide useful information about a program’s actual 
behavior in its intended computing environment, while proving is limited to conclusions 
about the program’s behavior in a postulated environment. 
 
In practice neither proving nor testing can guarantee complete confidence in the 
correctness of a program. Each has its advantages and limitations and should not be 
viewed as completing tools. Thus a metric is needed to reflect the degree of program 
correctness and plan and control additional resources needed for enhancing software 
quality. One such quantifiable metric of quality is called software reliability. A 
commonly used approach for measuring software reliability is via an analytical model 
whose parameters are generally estimated form available measures are then computed 
from the fitted model. 
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 2.4.2 Software Reliability Models 
A number of analytical models have been proposed to address the problem of software 
reliability measurement. These approaches are based mainly on the failure history of 
software and can be classified according to the nature of the failure process. 
 
2.4.2.1  Time Between Failures Models 
This is one of the earliest classes of models proposed for software reliability assessment. 
When the interest is in modeling times between failures, it is expected that the successive 
failure times will get longer as faults are removed from the software system.  
 
A number of models have been proposed to describe such failures. The most common 
approach is to denote the time between the (i-1)st and the ith failures with a random 
variable Ti. Basically the models assume that Ti follows a known distribution whose 
parameters depend on the number of faults remaining in the system after the (i-1)st 
failure. The assumed distribution is supposed to reflect the improvement in software 
quality as faults are detected and removed from the system. Another approach is to treat 
the failure times as realizations of a stochastic process and use an appropriate time-series 
model to describe the underlying failure process. The key models in this class are 
described below. 
 
• Jelinski and Moranda (JM) De-Eutrophication Model 
This is one of the earliest and probably the most commonly used model for assessing 
software reliability. It assumes that there are N software faults at the start of testing, each 
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 is independent of each other and is equally likely to cause a failure during testing. A 
detected fault is removed with certainty in a negligible time and no new faults are 
introduced during the debugging process. The software failure rate, or the hazard 
function, at any time is assumed to be proportional to the current fault content of the 
program, which is,  
Z(ti) = Φ[N – (i – 1)] 
Where Φ is a proportionality constant. This hazard function is constant between failures 
but decreases in steps of size Φ following the removal of each fault. A typical plot of the 
hazard function for N = 100 and Φ = 0.02 is shown in Figure 2.4. 
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   Figure 2.4 A Typical Plot of Z(ti) for the JM Model (N = 100, Φ = 0.02) 
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A variation of the above model was proposed by Moranda [58] to describe those testing 
situations where faults are not removed until the occurrence of a fatal one at which time 
the accumulated group of faults is removed. In such a situation, the hazard function after 
a restart can be assumed to be a fraction of the rate that attained when the system crashed. 
For this model, called the geometric de-eutrophication model, the hazard function during 
the ith testing interval is given by 
  
   Z(ti) = Dki-1 
Where D is the fault detection rate during the first interval and k is a constant (0 < k <1). 
 
• Schick and Wolverton (SW) Model 
This model is based on the same assumptions as the JM model that except the hazard 
function is assumed to be proportional to the current fault content of the program as well 
as to the time elapsed since the last failure. The hazard function is given by 
Z(ti) = Φ{[N – (i – 1)]}ti 
The above hazard rate is linear with time within each failure interval, returns to zero at 
the occurrence of a failure and increases linearly again but at a reduced slope, the 
decrease in slope being proportional to Φ. A typical behavior of Z(ti) for N = 150 and  
Φ = 0.02 is shown in follow Figure 2.5. 
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     Figure 2.5 A Typical Plot of Z(ti) for the SW Model (N = 150, Φ = 0.02) 
 
A modification of the above model was proposed by Schick and Wolverton [59] whereby 
the hazard function is assumed to be parabolic in test time and is given by 
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Z(ti) = Φ[N – (i – 1)](-ati2 + b ti + c) 
Where a, b, c are constants and the other quantities are as defined as above. This function 
consists of two components. The first is basically the hazard function of the JM model 
and the superimposition of the second term indicates that the likelihood of a failure 
occurring increases rapidly as the test time accumulates within a testing interval. At 
failure times (ti = 0), the hazard function is proportional to that of the JM model. 
 
 
• Goel and Okumoto Imperfect Debugging Model 
The above models assume that the faults are removed with certainty when detected. 
However that is not always true. Goel and Okumoto [60-61] proposed an imperfect 
debugging model which is basically an extension of the JM model. In this model, the 
number of faults in the system at time t-X(t) is treated as a Markov process whose 
transition probabilities are governed by the probability of imperfect debugging. Times 
between the transition of X(t) are taken to be exponentially distributed with rates 
dependent on the current fault content of the system. The hazard function during the 
interval between the (i-1)st and the ith failures is given by 
 
Z(ti) = [N – p(i-1)]λ 
Where N is the initial fault content of the system, p is the probability of imperfect 
debugging, and λ is the failure rate per fault. 
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 • Littlewood-Verrall Bayesian Model 
Littlewood and Verall [62-63] took a different approach to the development of a model 
for times between failures. They argued that software reliability should NOT be specified 
in terms of number of errors in the program. Specifically they assumed the times between 
failures follows an exponential distribution but the parameter of this distribution is treated 
as a random variable with a gamma distribution, which is: 
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where ψ(i) describes the quality of the programmer and the difficulty of the programming 
task. It is claimed that the failure phenomena in different environments can be explained 
by this model by taking different forms for the parameter ψ(i). 
 
2.4.2.2  Failure Count Models 
This class of models is concerned with modeling the number of failures seen or faults 
detected in given testing intervals. As faults are removed from the system, it is expected 
that the observed number of failures per unit time will decrease. If this is so, then the 
graph of the cumulative number of failures versus time will eventually level off. The time 
interval may be fixed a priori and the observed number of failures in each interval is 
treated as a random variable. 
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Several models have been suggested to describe such failure phenomena. The basic idea 
behind most of these models is that of a Poisson distribution whose parameter takes on 
different forms for different models. It should be noted that Poisson distribution has been 
 found to be an excellent model in many fields of application where interest is in the 
number of occurrences. 
 
• Goel-Okumoto Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process Model 
Goel and Okumoto [64] assumed that a software system is subject to failures at random 
times caused by faults present in the system. Letting N(t) be the cumulative number of 
failures observed by time t, they proposed that N(t) can be modeled as a nonhomoge-
neous Poisson process, i.e., as a Poisson process with a time dependent failure rate. Based 
on their study of actual failure data from many systems, they proposed the model as 
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m(t) is the expected number of failures observed by time t and the failure rate. a is the 
expected number of failures to be observed eventually and b is the fault detection rate per 
fault. This is a fundamental departure from the other models which treat the number of 
faults to be a fixed unknown constant. 
 
• Goel Generalized Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process Model 
Most of the times between failures and failure count models assume that a software 
system exhibits a decreasing failure rate pattern during testing. In other words, they 
assume that software quality continues to improve as testing progresses. In practice, it has 
been observed that in many testing situations, the failure rate first increases and then 
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 decreases. In order to model this increasing/decreasing failure rate process, Goel [65-66] 
proposed the following generalization of the Goel-Okumoto NHPP model. 
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where a is expected number of faults to be eventually detected, and b and c are constants 
that reflect the quality of testing. The failure rate for the model is given by 
   1')( −−=≡ cbt tabcemt cλ
• Musa Execution Time Model 
In this model Musa [67] makes assumptions that are similar to those of JM model except 
that the process modeled is the number of failures in specified execution time intervals. 
The hazard function for this model is given by 
 
  z(τ) = Φf(N – nc) 
where τ is the execution time utilized in executing the program up to the present, f is the 
linear execution frequency (average instruction execution rate divided by the number of 
instruction in the program), Φ is a proportionality constant, which is a fault exposure 
ratio that relates fault exposure frequency to the linear execution frequency, and nc is the 
number of faults corrected during (0, τ). 
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 One of the main features of this model is that it explicitly emphasizes the dependence of 
the hazard function on execution time. Musa also provides a systematic approach for 
converting the model so that it can be applicable for calendar time as well. 
 
• Shooman Exponential Model 
This model is essentially similar to the JM model. For this model the hazard function is 
of the following form 
  )]([)( τcnI
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Where t is the operating time of the system measured from its initial activation, I is the 
total number of instructions in the program, τ is the debugging time since the start of 
system integration, nc(τ) is the total number of faults corrected during τ, normalized with 
respect to I, and k is a proportionality constant. 
 
• Generalized Poisson Model 
This is a variation of the NHPP model of Goel and Okumoto and assumes a mean value 
function of the following form, 
   m(ti) = Φ(N – Mi -1 ) tiα 
where Mi –1 is the total number of faults removed up to the end of the (i – 1)st debugging 
interval, Φ is a constant of proportionality, and α is a constant used to rescale time ti . 
 
• IBM Binomial and Poisson Models 
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 Brooks and Motley [68] consider the fault detection process during software testing to be 
a discrete process, following a binomial or a Poisson distribution. The software system is 
assumed to be developed and tested incrementally. They claim that both models can be 
applied at the module or the system level. 
 
2.4.2.3  Fault Seeding Models 
In fault seeding models, a known number of faults is seeded (planted) in the program. 
The number of exposed seeded and indigenous faults is counted after testing. Using 
combinatorics and maximum likelihood estimation, the number of indigenous faults in 
the program and the reliability of the software can be estimated. 
 
• Mills Seeding Model 
The most popular and most basic fault seeding model is Mills’ Hypergeometric model 
[69]. This model requires that a number of known faults are randomly seeded in the 
program to be tested. The program is then tested for some amount of time. The number of 
original indigenous faults can be estimated from the number of indigenous and seeded 
faults uncovered during the test by using the hypergeometric distribution.  
 
Lipow [70] modified this problem by considering probability of finding a fault, of either 
kind, in any test of the software. Then for statistically independent tests, the probability 
of finding given numbers of indigenous and seeded faults can be calculated. In another 
modification, Basin [71] suggested a two stage procedure with the use of two 
programmers to estimate the number of indigenous faults in the program. 
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 2.4.2.4  Input Domain Based Models 
The basic approach in the input domain based models is to generate a set of test cases 
from an input (operational) distribution. Because of the difficulty in estimating the input 
distribution, the various models in this group partition the input domain into a set of 
equivalence classes. An equivalence class is usually associated with a program path. The 
reliability measure is calculated from the number of failures observed during symbolic or 
physical execution of the sampled test cases. 
 
• Nelson Model 
In this input domain based model [72], the reliability of the software is measured by 
running the software for a sample of n inputs. The n inputs are randomly chosen from the 
input domain set E = (Ei: i = 1, …, N) where each Ei is the set of data values needed to 
make a run. The random sampling of n inputs is done according to a probability 
distribution Pi; the set (Pi: i = 1, …N) is the operational profile or simply the user input 
distribution. If ne is the number of inputs that resulted in execution failures, then an 
unbiased estimate of software reliability 
n
nR e−= 1) . The test set used during the 
verification phase may not be representative of the expected operational usage.  
 
• Ramamoorthy and Bastani Model 
Ramamoorthy and Bastani [73] concerned the reliability of critical, real-time, process 
control programs where no failures should be detected during the reliability estimation 
phase, so that the reliability estimate is 1. Thus the important metric of concern is the 
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 confidence in the reliability estimate. This model provides an estimate of the conditional 
probability that the program is correct for all possible inputs given that it is correct for a 
specified set of inputs. The basic assumption is that the outcome of each test case 
provides at least some stochastic information about the behavior of the program for other 
points that are close to the test points. A main result of this model is 
 
 P{program is correct for all points in [a, a + V]  
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where λ is a parameter which is deduced from some measure of the complexity of the 
source code.  
 
Unlike other sampling models, this approach allows any test case selection strategy to be 
used. Hence, the testing effort can be minimized by choosing test cases which exercise 
error-prone constructs. However, the model concerning the parameter λ needs to be 
validated experimentally. 
 
2.5 Petri Nets in Reliability Analysis of Integrated Networks 
2.5.1 Introduction of Petri Nets 
Petri nets were originally introduced by C.A. Petri in his seminal PhD thesis in 1964, for 
the study of the qualitative properties of systems exhibiting concurrency and 
34 
 synchronization characteristics. Although many other models of concurrent and 
distributed systems have been developed since then, Petri nets are still a central model for 
concurrent systems with respect to both the theory and applications. They are often used 
as a yardstick for other models of concurrency.  The performance evaluation of 
communication systems and flexible manufacturing systems, resource allocation 
problems in information processing systems, communication protocols, production 
control and process synchronization can be cited as examples of Petri nets applications. 
This diversity of application has encouraged the study of Petri net theory and both the 
theory and the applications of this model have been flourishing [90-96] in last decade.  
 
One of the main attractions of Petri nets is the way in which the basic aspects of 
concurrent systems are identified both conceptually and mathematically. The ease of 
conceptual modeling (based also on a natural graphical notation) makes Petri nets the 
model of choice in many applications. The natural way in which Petri nets allow to 
formally capture many of the basic notions and issues of concurrent systems contributed 
greatly to the development of a rich theory of concurrent systems based on Petri nets. 
 
2.5.1.1  Evolution of Petri Net Models 
The first nets were called Condition/Event Nets (CE-nets). This net model allows each 
place to contain at most one token – because the place is considered to represent a 
Boolean condition, which can be either true or false. In the following years a large 
number of people contributed to the development of new net models, basic concepts, and 
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 analysis methods. One of the most notable results was the development of Place/ 
Transition nets (PT-nets). This net model allows a place to contain several tokens.  
 
For theoretical considerations, CE-nets are more tractable than PT-nets, and much of the 
theoretical work concerning the definition of basic concepts and analysis methods has 
been performed on CE-nets. A new net model called Elementary Nets (EN-nets) was 
proposed later. The basic ideas of this net model are very close to those of CE-nets – but 
EN-nets avoid some of the technical problems that turned out to be presented in the 
original definition of CE-nets. 
 
PT-nets were used for practical applications. But this net model was often too low-level 
to cope with the real-world applications in a manageable way, and different researchers 
started to develop their own extensions of PT-nets – adding concepts such as priority 
between transitions, time delays, global variables to be tested and updated by transitions, 
zero testing of places etc.  In this way a large number of different net models were 
defined. However, most of these net models were designed with a single, and often very 
narrow application area in mind. Although some of the net models could be used to give 
adequate descriptions of certain systems, most of the net models possessed almost no 
analytic power. The main reason was the large variety of different net models. So it is a 
difficult task to translate an analysis method developed for one net model to another. 
The breakthrough with respect to this problem came when Predicate/Transition Nets 
(PrT-nets) were presented. PrT-nets were the first kind of high-level nets which were 
constructed without any particular application area in mind. PrT-nets form a 
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 generalization of PT-nets and CE-nets and can be related to PT-nets and CE-nets in a 
formal way. This makes it possible to generalize most of the basic concepts and analysis 
methods that have been developed for these net models. 
 
However, PrT-nets present some technical problems when the analysis methods of place 
invariants and transition invariants are generalized. It is possible to calculate inviriants 
for PrT-nets, but the interpretations of the invariants is difficult and must be done with 
great care to avoid erroneous results. The problem arises because of the variables which 
appear in the arc expressions of PrT-nets. These variables also appear in the invariants, 
and to interpret the invariants it is necessary to bind the variables, via a complex set of 
substitution rules. The first version of Colored Petri Nets (CPN1) was defined to 
overcome this problem. The main ideas of this net model are directly inspired by PrT-
nets, but the relation between a binding element and the token colors involved in the 
occurrence is now defined by functions and not by expressions as in PrT-nets. This 
removes the variables, and invariants can be interpreted without problems. 
 
Colored Petri nets (CP-nets) have two different representations. The expression 
representation use arc expressions and guards, while the function representation use 
linear functions between multi-sets. Moreover, there are formal translations between the 
two representations. The expression representation is nearly identical to PrT-nets, while 
the function representation is nearly identical to CPN. Most of the practical applications 
of Petri nets use either PrT-nets or CP-nets although several other kinds of high-level nets 
have been proposed. The main difference between PrT-nets and CP-nets are hidden 
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 inside the methods to calculate and interpret place and transition invariants. So PrT-nets 
and CP-nets are viewed as two slightly different dialects of the same language due to 
very little difference between them. 
 
Several other classes of high-level nets include algebraic nets, CP-nets with algebraic 
specifications, many sorted high-level nets, numerical Petri nets, OBJSA nets, PrE-nets 
with algebraic specifications, Petri nets with structured tokens and relation nets. All these 
net classes are quite similar to CP-nets but use different inscription languages. The 
functional programming language Standard ML has been developed at Edinburgh 
University and is used for the inscriptions of CP-nets. It is also one of the programming 
languages used in the implementation of the CPN tools described in section 2.5.3. 
 
“Petri nets” is a generic name for a whole class of models that can be divided into three 
main layers. The first layer is the most fundamental and is especially well suited for a 
thorough investigation of foundational issues of concurrent systems.  The basic model is 
that of elementary net systems or EN-nets [110-112]. For modeling real-life systems of 
nontrivial size, elementary net systems may explode in size and become much too large 
to be managed effectively. The second layer allows one to collapse the repetitive features 
of elementary net systems in order to get more compact representations. The basic model 
here is place/transition systems or PT-nets [113-114]. Finally, the third layer is that of 
high level nets, where one uses essentially algebra and logic to yield compact nets 
suitable for real-life applications. Colored Petri nets [103] and predicate/transition nets 
(PrT-nets) [115] are the best known high-level models. 
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In the framework of EN systems, a concurrent system is seen as consisting of local states, 
local transitions (between local states), and the neighborhood relationship between the 
local transitions and the local states. The global state of a system (its configuration) is 
simply the collection of all local states that concurrently hold. The extent of change 
caused by a (local) transition is fixed and is restricted to the neighborhood of the 
transition; it does not depend on the part of the global state that is outside the 
neighborhood. This simple and elegant setup lends itself to a nice graphical 
representation of both the static structure of the system and its dynamic behavior.  
 
The EN system model has resulted from a number of modifications of the basic system 
model called Condition/Event Systems, or CE-nets. The most significant difference is 
that CE-nets transitions can also be reserved, recovering in this way the history of the 
system. An EN system can also be viewed as a special case of a PT-net. 
 
For many practical applications, the execution time and/or stochastic processes need to be 
considered. This leads to timed and stochastic Petri nets. 
 
2.5.1.2  Definitions of Petri Nets 
Petri net definitions have a “static” part and a “dynamic” part. The former describes net 
topology and a momentary marking. The latter describes the movement of tokens in time 
via a switching (or firing) rule. 
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 A Petri net is a bipartite directed graph. It consists of two types of nodes: places (drawn 
as circles), which can be marked with tokens (drawn as bold face dots), and transitions 
(drawn as squares), which are marked by the (random or deterministic) time, D by which 
they delay the output of tokens. If D = 0, the transition is called immediate; otherwise it is 
called timed. The movement of tokens is governed by so-called firing rule. If all input 
places of a transition are marked by at least one token each, then this transition is called 
enabled; and after a delay D ≥ 0 this transition switches or fires, i.e., it removes one token 
from each of its input places and adds one to each of its output places. See Figure 2.6, 
where place 3 (p3) is at the same time an input and an output of transition 1, t1.  
 
   
          ...          … 
    1   1 
 
             … 
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    2     Output (or successor) places of t1 
        … 
Input (for processor) Place of t1 
          3 
      … 
T 
•
•
 
 
Figure 2.6 Input and Output Places of A Transition 
 
 
The number of tokens in a Petri net is not necessarily a constant. Tokens move along (or 
through) edges at infinite speed. Figure 2.7 shows an example of a transition with 3 input 
places and 2 output places.  
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Figure 2.7 The Delayed Switching of A Transition; (a) prior to, (b) after switching 
 
If a PN is initially a multigraph as shown in Figure 2.8, then it is replaced by a graph with 
weighted edges where the default value is 1. The transition of Figure 2.8 is not enabled, 
since p2 has only one token but needs at least 2 for firing. 
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Figure 2.8 Replacing A Multigraph by A Graph With Weighted Edges 
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 2.5.1.3  Timed Petri Nets (TPN) 
One of the main attractions of Petri nets is the way in which the basic aspects of 
concurrent systems are identified both conceptually and mathematically. The ease of 
conceptual modeling (based also on a natural graphic notation) makes Petri nets the 
model of choice in many applications.  
 
Petri nets (PN) were originally developed and used for the study of the qualitative 
properties of systems exhibiting concurrency and synchronization characteristics. The use 
of PN-based techniques for the quantitative analysis of systems requires the introduction 
of temporal specifications within the basic, untimed models. This fact leads to several 
different proposals for the introduction of temporal specifications in PN.  
 
The main alternatives that characterize the different proposals concern 
• The PN elements associated with timing (normally either places or transitions, 
but some also looked into the possibility of defining timed arcs or tokens), 
• The firing semantics in the case of timed transitions (either atomic firing or 
firing in three phases), 
• The nature of the temporal specification (either deterministic or probabilistic), 
• The conflict resolution policy. 
 
We consider PN models that are augmented with a temporal specification by associating 
a (possibly null) firing delay with transitions. The transition firing operation is assumed 
to be atomic, i.e., tokens are removed from input places and put into output places with a 
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 single, indivisible operation, after the transition firing delay has elapsed. The 
specification of the firing delay of timed transitions is of probabilistic nature, so that 
either the probability density function (pdf) or the cumulative distribution function (cdf) 
of the delay associated with a transition needs to be specified. Such functions may be 
general, or even degenerate, thus allowing the definition of constant (possibly null) 
delays. We refer to this type of timed Petri nets as Generally Distributed Times 
Transitions Stochastic Petri Nets (GDTT_SPN).  
 
The class of TPN is however too wide to allow a simple solution of any GDTT_SPN 
model; so special attention are paid to two special subclasses of GDTT_SPN, that have 
nice property of permitting a reasonably simple representation metrics: 
• Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN), where all transition firing delays are non-null and 
have negative exponential pdf. 
• Generalized SPN (GSPN), where immediate (null-delay) transitions are freely 
mixed with timed transitions associated with exponentially distributed non-
null random firing delays. 
 
A SPN is a GDTT_SPN in which the W function assigns to each transition an 
exponential pdf. Since the exponential distribution is fully characterized by its mean 
value (or by its inverse, the rate), and its memory-less characteristics makes inessential. 
The definition of a SPN is SPN = (P, T, I, O, H, M0, W) 
Where  - (P, T, I, O, H, M0) is the underlying PN system, as for GDTT_SPN, 
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 W: T → R is a weight function; w(t) is the rate of the exponential distribution 
associated with transition t. w(t) is also called the firing rate of transition t. 
 
The key factor that limits the applicability of SPN models is the complexity of their 
analysis. The possibly very large number of reachable markings is by far the most critical 
reason among many other reasons. Other aspects may however add to the model solution 
complexity. One of these is due to the presence in one model of activities that take place 
on a much faster (or slower) time scale than the one relating to the events that play a 
critical role on the overall performance. This results in systems of linear equations which 
are difficult to solve with an acceptable degree of accuracy by means of the usual 
numerical techniques. On the other hand, neglecting the “fast” (or “slow”) activities may 
result in models which are logically incorrect.  
 
GSPN models comprise two types of transitions: 
• Timed transitions, which are associated with random, exponentially 
distributed firing delays, as in SPN, and 
• Immediate transitions, firing in zero time with priority over timed transitions. 
Furthermore, different priority levels of immediate transitions can be used, and weights 
are associated with immediate transitions. 
 
2.5.2 Colored Petri Nets  
A Colored Petri Net (CPN) model of a system describes the states a system can get into, 
and shows events which can occur and the states which will result if an event occurs for 
44 
 each state. A CPN state is broken into a number of component states, each component 
being determined by tokens in a place. Tokens can have arbitrary values determined by 
their type or color. Each distinct token value can be thought of as a different colored or 
shaped piece on a board game. The places are like the parts of a game board where you 
can put pieces. Events are represented by transitions. They are connected to some of the 
places by arcs next to which are expressions that determine the redistribution of tokens 
that occurs when the event occurs. 
 
High level Petri nets, such as CPN and SPN have the particular feature of presenting 
concise and easy to understand graphical models that visualize the interactions between 
the different communicating and cooperating entities of the system. The applications of 
high level Petri Nets to the modeling and simulation of communication protocol has 
increased in recent years [97-103].  
 
CPNs, and especially Hierarchical CPN (HCPN)[103], are the response to the first 
requirement, as they have means for modeling and specifying very large scale systems, 
with their colored tokens and hierarchy constructs, folding the system description into 
very compact forms. While SPNs (with its extensions, GSPNs and Deterministic SPNs) 
constitute an answer to the second requirement, as they can be useful in modeling 
complex system with a very high level of abstraction. 
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 2.5.2.1  Advantages of Colored Petri Nets  
There are three different reasons to use CPN models. First of all, a CPN model is a 
description of the modeled system, and it can be used as a specification (of a system 
which we want to build) or as a presentation (of a system which we want to explain). By 
creating a model we can investigate a new system before constructing it. This is in 
particular for networks where design errors may jeopardize reliability or be expensive to 
maintain. Secondly, the behavior of a CPN model can be analyzed, either by means of 
simulation (which is equivalent to program execution and program debugging) or by 
means of more formal analysis methods (which are equivalent to program verification). 
Finally, the process of creating the description and performing the analysis usually gives 
the modeler a dramatically improved understanding of the modeled system.  
 
There exist many different modeling languages that it would be very difficult and time 
consuming to make an explicit comparison with all of them. Instead we can make an 
implicit comparison by listing twelve of those properties which make CPN a valuable 
language for the design, specification and analysis of many different types of systems. 
Most of the advantages of CPN are subjective by nature and cannot be proved in any 
formal way. Jensen [94] presented the general list of CPN advantages. 
• CPNs have a graphical presentation. The graphic form is intuitively appealing. 
CPN diagrams resemble many of the informal drawings which designers and 
engineers make while they construct and analyze a system. 
• CPNs have a well-defined semantics which unambiguously defines the behavior 
of each CPN. It is the presence of the semantics which makes it possible to 
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 implement simulators for CPNs, and it is also the semantics which forms the 
foundation for the formal analysis methods. 
• CPNs are very general and can be used to describe a large variety of different 
systems. The CPN applications range from informal systems (e.g. the description 
of work processes) to formal systems (e.g. communication protocols), from 
software systems (e.g. distributed algorithms) to hardware systems (e.g. VLSI 
chips), finally from systems with a lot of concurrent processes (e.g. flexible 
manufacturing) to systems with no concurrency (e.g. sequential algorithms). 
• CPNs have very few, but powerful, primitives. The definition of CPNs is rather 
short and it builds upon standard concepts which many system modelers already 
know from mathematics and programming languages. This means that it is 
relatively easy to learn to use CPNs. However, the small number of primitives 
also means that it is much easier to develop strong analysis methods. 
• CPNs have an explicit description of both states and actions. This is in contrast to 
most system description languages which describe either the states or the actions 
but not both. At some instances it may be convenient to concentrate on the states 
while at other instances it may be more convenient to concentrate on the actions. 
• CPNs have a semantics which builds upon true concurrency, instead of 
interleaving. The notions of conflict, concurrency and casual dependency can be 
defined in a very natural and straightforward way. In an interleaving semantics it 
is impossible to have two actions in the same step, and thus concurrency only 
means that the actions can occur after each other, in any order.  
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 • CPNs offer hierarchical descriptions. This means that we can construct a large 
CPN by relating smaller CPNs to each other, in a well-defined way. The 
hierarchy constructs of CPNs play a role similar to that of subroutines, 
procedures and modules of programming languages, and it is the existence of 
hierarchical CPNs which makes it possible to model very large systems in a 
manageable and modular way. 
•  CPNs integrate the description of control and synchronization with the 
description of data manipulation. This means that it can be seen what the 
environment, enabling conditions and effects of an action are. Many other 
graphical description languages work with graphs which only describe the 
environment of an action – while the detailed behavior is specified separately. 
• CPNs are stable towards minor changes of the modeled system. This is proved by 
many practical experiences and it means that small modifications of the modeled 
system do not completely change the structure of the CPN.  
• CPNs offer interactive simulations where the results are presented directly on the 
CPN diagram. The simulation makes it possible to debug a large model while it 
is being constructed – analogously to a good programmer debugging the 
individual parts of a program as he finishes them.  
• CPNs have a large number of formal analysis methods by which properties of 
CPNs can be proved. There are four basic classes of formal analysis methods: 
construction of occurrence graphs (representing all reachable markings), 
calculation and interpretations of system invariants (called place and transition 
invariants), reductions (which shrink the net without changing a certain selected 
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 set of properties) and checking of structural properties (which guarantee certain 
behavioral properties). 
• CPNs have computer tools supporting their drawing, simulation and formal 
analysis. This makes it possible to handle even large nets without drowning in 
details and without making trivial calculation errors. The existence of such 
computer tools is extremely important for the practical use of CPNs. 
 
Many of above listed advantages of CPNs are also valid for other kinds of high-level 
nets, P/T nets, and other kinds of modeling languages. Thus CPNs must be used together 
with other kinds of modeling languages to describe different aspects of the system, then 
the resulting set of descriptions should be considered as complementary, not alternatives. 
 
2.5.3 Tools for Petri Nets Applications 
There have been a lot of tools for Petri Nets (PN) applications, with the development of 
Petri Nets theory. The simplest PN tool shows the typical changes of state, sometimes 
interpretable as the wandering of tokens and the waiting times in between. This is often 
done in connection with a graphical display of the PN.  Some other tools include: 
• SHARPE [105] 
• Great SPN [106] 
• ESP [107] 
• Ultra SAN [108] 
• SPNP [109] 
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 2.5.4 PN_RAIN Approach 
A practical network is usually subject to node failures, link failures, and software failures, 
where node failures and link failures here are viewed as failures on hardware aspect. 
Each type of failure can occur concurrently, as in Figure 2.9. 
 
 
    e1       e2 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Sample Concurrent Events 
The failure events e1 and e2 can occur concurrently, in the sense that they both have 
concession and are independent in not having any pre or post conditions in common. 
Reflecting to the network under study (refer to Chapter 3), that means node failures, link 
failures, and software failures can occur concurrently in general, but two failures can not 
occur at the same time among a node and its incident links. 
 
Taking the networks described in Chapter 3 as the research object, an approach of Petri 
Nets in Reliability Analysis of Integrated Networks (PN_RAIN) will be introduced. 
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Figure 2.10 States Transition of A Node in An Integrated Network 
 
Generally there are three types of failure processes, initiated by link failures, node 
failures, and software failures. Link failures represent failures associated with links 
incident to the node. The three failure processes are independent and concurrent. In 
Figure 2.10, there are three different colors of tokens representing three types of failures. 
Each of D1, D2, and D3 represents the firing delay of each type of token correspondingly. 
In a practical network, each type of firing delay follows the stochastic distribution of link 
failures, or node (hardware) failure, or software failures. Figure 2.10 represents a node in 
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 an integrated network. There are four nodes in Figure 4.1, thus the node state in Figure 
2.10 can replicate four times, as shown in Figure 2.11.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11 A Sample Bridge Network (Figure 4.1) With Node States 
 
2.5.4.1  Construction of PN_RAIN Models 
For all modeling languages, it takes a considerable amount of experience to become a 
good and efficient CPN modeler. The construction of CPN models usually follows: 
 
• Identify some of the most important components of the modeled system. 
• Consider the purpose of the model and determine an adequate level of detail. 
• Try to find good mnemonic names for objects, processes, states and actions. 
• Do not attempt to cover all aspects of the considered system in the first 
version of the model. 
• Choose one of the processes in the modeled system and try to make an 
isolated net for this process. 
• Use the net structure to model control and the net inscriptions to model data 
manipulations. 
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 • Distinguish between different kinds of tokens. 
• Use different kinds of color sets. 
• Augment the process net by describing how the process communicates/ 
interacts with other processes. 
• Investigate whether there are classes of similar processes. 
• Combine the subnets of the individual process to a large model. 
 
Assume we have two types of processes, N-processes (for node) and L-processes (for 
link). There are four N-processes and five L-processes in a network depicted by Figure 
2.11. A N-process is subject to the node (hardware) failures and software failures. Since 
the failure of either hardware or software of a node will bring its incident links down, a 
L-process is subject to failures of its incident nodes and link itself. Obviously node 
failures, software failures and link failures follow different stochastic distributions, but 
we assume same type of failure follows the same stochastic distribution in different 
processes. There is only one token in each place, which means one type of failure can 
only occur once among the corresponding node and its links. When any failure (by nodes 
or links) transition is enabled and fired, the state of the system changes.  
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Figure 2.12 PT-net Describing the Processes in An Integrated Network 
 
 
In Figure 2.12 we have to represent the two kinds of processes by two separate subnets – 
even though the N-process and L-process encounter failures in a similar way. This kind 
of problem is annoying for small problem, and it may be catastrophic for the description 
of a large network. Practical systems often contain components which are similar but not 
identical. Using PT-nets, these components must be represented by disjoint subnets with 
a nearly identical structure. So the practical use of PT-nets to describe real-world systems 
has demonstrated a need for more powerful net types to describe complex systems in a 
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 manageable way. The development of high level Petri nets constitutes a very significant 
improvement in this respect. CP-nets (CPN) belong to the class of high-level nets. 
The more compact representation has been achieved by equipping each token with an 
attached data value – token color. For a given place all tokens must have token colors that 
belong to a specified type. This type is called the color set of the place. The use of color 
sets in CPN is analogous to the use of types in programming languages.  
 
A CPN consists of three different parts: the net structure (i.e. the places, transitions and 
arcs), the declarations and the net inscriptions (i.e., the various text strings which are 
attached to the elements of the net structure). CPN ML language is used for declarations 
in our study. 
 
Now the system described in Figure 2.13 can be represented in a compact way by CPN as 
in Figure 2.14. A distribution of tokens on the places is called a marking. The initial 
marking is determined by evaluating the initialization expressions, i.e., the underlined 
expressions next to the places. In the initial marking (Figure 2.6) there is one (L, 0) 
tokens on A, B and C, while D has no tokens. Moreover, each of FL, FN, FS has one 
token. The marking of each place is a multi-set over the color set attached to the place. 
Multi-sets allow two or more tokens to have identical token colors. We shall also allow 
initialization expressions which evaluate to a single color c, and interpret this as if the 
value was 1’c (i.e., the multi-set contains one appearance of c).  
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Color U= with N | L; 
Color I = int; 
Color P = product U*I; 
Color E = with e; 
Var x: U; 
Var i: I; 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13 CPN Describing the Failure Modes in the Integrated Network 
 
 
There are some arc expressions around transitions in Figure 2.13. These expressions have 
two variables, x and i, and from the declarations it can be seen that x has type U while i 
has type I, e is an element of the color set E while N and L are elements of U.  x and i 
need to be bound to colors of the corresponding types (i.e., elements of the color sets U 
and I). One possibility is to bind x to N and i to zero: then we get the binding b1 = <x = 
N, i = 0>. For each binding we can check whether the transition with that binding is 
enabled in the current marking. For the binding b1 the two input arc expressions evaluate 
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 to (N, 0) and 1’e, respectively. Thus we conclude that b1 is enabled. CPN contains both 
case expressions and if-expressions to illustrate different possibilities, such as 
“case x of N => 1’e | L => 1’e”. Expressions in Figure 2.6 with an italic style are just to 
show the choice functions, no special meaning in the specific system. More CPN ML 
knowledge can be referred to [94, 97]. 
 
From the above experiment, it is observed that the benefits achieved by using CPN 
instead of PT-nets, are very similar to those achieved by using high-level programming 
languages instead of assembly languages. 
• Description and analysis become more compact and manageable because the 
complexity is divided between the net structure, the declarations and the net 
inscriptions. 
• It becomes possible to describe simple data manipulations in a much more 
direct way by using arc expressions instead of a complex set of places, 
transitions and arcs. 
• It becomes easier to see similarities and differences between similar system 
parts because they are represented by the same subnet. 
• The description is more redundant and this means that there will be less errors. 
Some kinds of errors become impossible or at least unlikely, e.g., it is difficult to add an 
extra state for the N-processes without considering whether the same should be done for 
the L-processes. It is possible to create hierarchical descriptions, i.e., structure a large 
description as a set of smaller CPN with a well-defined relationship. 
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 2.6 Possibilistic Reliability Functions and Fuzzy Sets Theory 
Classically, reliability theory has been based upon binary structure functions and 
probability theory. A binary structure function represents the deterministic relation 
between the component states and the system states, while probability theory is applied to 
develop the notion reliability of both components and systems. 
 
Some obvious problems arise while applying this theory. A binary structure function 
allows only two states: a perfect functioning or a complete failure. The binary structure 
functions are too restrictive to model real life situations, since the concepts of failure or 
functioning are not always well defined or since a binary approach is too restrictive [81]. 
Hence, intermediate states must be allowed to describe the more complex systems. This 
is the topic of multistate structure functions that is closely related to fuzzy set theory 
since many real life problems simply cannot be represented by a dichotomous model. 
 
By allowing intermediate states, we must extend the classical notion of reliability based 
on the probability of failure or functioning of a component or system. Some research 
showed that probability theory is not the only possible way of representing imprecision 
and uncertainty. Possibility theory and fuzzy set theory, e.g., provide useful alternatives 
to the probabilistic approach of reliability. 
 
In classical reliability, probability theory is considered as the unifying model to represent 
uncertainty since classical reliability theory was developed at the early 30s and mainly 
after the WWII as an application of probability theory and quality control. Later on, the 
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 reliability theory became a new, mainly a probabilistic field of interest. At that time, non-
probabilistic uncertainty models were not available or at least not very popular. The 
confidence that the system will function properly at a certain level is classically defined 
in a probabilistic way, and leads to the well-known definition that the reliability of a 
system is the probability that the system functions during a certain time period.  
 
On the other hand, some important deficiencies of the probabilistic approach became 
apparent in the early 60s. NASA developed alternative models to analyze the reliability 
aspects of the Saturnus V missile, since a classical approach failed. There were some 
reasons why a probabilistic approach was not successful. There was, e.g., an 
accumulation of errors due to the lack of sufficient statistical information about the 
failure aspects of the components, hence, there was an overestimation of the probability 
of failure. A qualitative approach was more appropriate. Since the introduction of fuzzy 
sets and possibility theory, new tools became available to model uncertainty. They are 
more qualitative by nature and can therefore be applied to situations where a quantitative 
approach is very unlikely or even impossible. 
 
Several recent models to solve the problems mentioned about have been proposed based 
on fuzzy set theory. The fuzzy probabilities, the fuzzification of classical reliability 
function, and the combination of fuzzy states and fuzzy probabilities were introduced 
[82-84].  
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CHAPTER 3 
PROBLEM FORMULATION 
 
Network failures can arise in a couple of different ways. Failures may occur because the 
routing algorithm is unable to detect a functional route, although one exists. Failures may 
also happen if the flow control algorithm causes the network to be flooded with traffic, 
resulting in network failure due to overload. Both events are caused by software control 
of the network as protocols we usually mention, rather than by topological 
considerations.  
 
Failures at a topological level can result from actions by intentional attack, natural 
disaster, or component wear-out. Intentional attack are purposefully selected to damage 
and inflict the network operation, comparing natural disasters are not. Typically damages 
on some portion of topology is in a small region but not in random. On the other hand, 
component wear-out is a random process and failures of each component are 
independent. 
 
The network reliability and availability problem to be studied is focused on practical 
networks integrated with component systems where the software and hardware 
subsystems in nodes and hardware of transmission links are subject to independent 
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 failures, additionally the 1:1 system redundancy initiatives deployed to improve the 
network high availability are also considered. 
 
The problem needs to be formulated before proposing the approach. A stochastic network 
is a graph G = (V, E), where V and E are the sets of vertices (node, V) and edges (link, E) 
of G. Each node, link, group, and the network is either operational or failed. Edge failures 
are mutually independent of each other with assumed or known probabilities. Nodes are 
mutually independent of each other with derivable probabilities. A node is operational if 
and only if both its contained software and hardware operate as intended. When a node 
fails, all links incident to the node also fail.  
 
Usually nodes are subject to hardware and software failures while links are only related 
to the hardware problems. In practice, software such as control and communication 
protocols are stored in servers of the network. In some cases, hardware failures are 
induced by software failures. In such a situation, we assume that the hardware and 
software are in series inside a node, and fail independently. So the failure of a node 
results from the failure of the hardware part or the software part, or both. Software debug 
is assumed to be perfect, that is, debugging does not introduce new faults.  
 
Notations are defined as following: 
s, t   source, terminal nodes of node pair 
n, m  number of nodes, links in the network 
Vi , Ej   node i, link j in the network, where i = 1, 2, …n,   j = 1, 2, …m 
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 αi , βj   operational probability of node i, link j  
αih   operational probability of hardware part in node i  
αis   probability of software part in node i functions as designed 
εi    utilization of software inside node i 
h(ti)      hazard function during the time ti, between the (i-1)st and ith failure  
Si, Fi   event i which is successful, failed 
|S|, |F|   number of successful events, failed events 
Ni, Ki    number of failed, operational links directed into node i 
Si j , Fi, j   links with terminal node j are operational, failed as specified by event i 
R     node-pair reliability from s to t 
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CHAPTER 4 
APPROACHES FOR CALCULATING NETWORK RELIABILITY 
 
4.1   Probabilistic and Deterministic Networks 
A network G = (V, E) consists of a set V of nodes together with a set E of edges, 
representing pairs of nodes. At any instant the elements of the network (nodes and/or 
edges) will be in either of two possible states, working or failed. In a deterministic 
network, it is considered that an adversary can successfully attack working elements, 
resulting their failure or inactivation. The failure of an edge means that it is removed 
from the network; while the failure of a node means that the node and all its incident 
edges are removed from the network.  
 
In deterministic network models, the focus is typically on evaluating the worst-case 
performance of the network, in which the adversary intelligently chooses certain elements 
to render inactive, that would result in the maximum damage to the network. This type of 
network thus provides a conservative assessment of performance, and it would be 
partially appropriate in the design of robust systems. 
 
On the other hand, it is assumed in probabilistic networks that, at any instant, elements 
fail randomly and independently of one another, according to certain known probabilities. 
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 Specifically, each node i has an associated reliability pi indicating the probability that it is 
operational, and each edge k has a reliability pk which is the probability that it is 
operational. Thus at any instant the elements of the network fail independently with 
probabilities qi = 1- pi and qk = 1- pk, respectively.  
 
In these circumstances, one would be interested in assessing the average performance of 
the network, under the assumption of random (as opposed to malevolent) failures. It is 
also possible to allow for dependent failure modes, at the expense of added data-
gathering requirements and increased subsequent computation. For example, the edges 
incident with a given node might be subject to certain common influences (such as 
weather, interference, or jamming), and these edges might therefore tend to fail together, 
rather than independently; or the failure of one edge might place additional stress on the 
other operating incident edges, making them more likely to fail. 
 
Graph theory plays a key role in the analysis and design of reliable or invulnerable 
networks. According to Boesch [23], one can use a deterministic model that is called 
network vulnerability, contrasting to the usual probabilistic model for network reliability. 
Many different vulnerability criteria and the related synthesis results were reviewed. 
These synthesis problems are all graph external questions. Certain reliability synthesis 
problems can be converted to a vulnerability question. He distinguished between two 
types of models, summarized the relevant graph theoretic notions and then summarized 
the major results corresponding to each model. 
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 4.2 Network Operations 
Network reliability is concerned with the ability of a network to carry out a desired 
network operation. Therefore, an important first step is to identify necessary network 
operations. 
 
The most common network operation is maintaining some connections or links between a 
source node s to a target node t.  Two-terminal reliability is defined as the probability that 
there exists at least an s-t path in a probabilistic graph G. In the directed case, the 
problem is usually called s-t connectedness. 
 
The second most common operation in networks is broadcasting. We define the all-
terminal reliability to be the probability that for every pair of nodes there is at least a path 
between. This is equivalent to the probability that there is at least one spanning tree in the 
graph. In a directed case, the reachability is the probability that there are paths from the 
source node to every other node.  
 
The third and final one involves pair-wise communication of k specified nodes, 2 ≤ k ≤ n. 
the k-terminal reliability is the probability that for k specified target nodes, the graph 
contains paths between each pair of the k nodes. The directed analogue is called s-t 
connectedness.  
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 4.3  General Approaches for Calculating the Reliability of Probabilistic Networks 
There are several types of general approaches for calculating the reliability of 
probabilistic networks. Suppose that G = (N, E) is a directed network, having a 
distinguishable source node s and distinguishable destination node t. The nodes of G are 
assumed to be perfect, whereas the edges k∈E are assumed to fail in a statistically 
independent fashion with known probabilities qk = 1 – pk .  We will illustrate the general 
approaches with the two-terminal reliability Rst(G) which is the probability of that there 
is a path of operative edges from s to t in G.  
 
4.3.1 State-space Enumeration 
The most fundamental method of calculating Rst(G) uses state-space enumeration and 
dates back to Moore and Shannon [19]. It is a simple strategy that enumerates all states 
(all possible subgraphs), determines which are pathsets, and sums the occurrence 
probabilities of each pathset. Determining whether a state is a pathset is accomplished in 
general by using the supplied pathset recognition algorithm which employs standard 
path-finding or spanning tree methods.  
 
Since each of the m = | E | edges of G assumes one of two states, working or failed, the 
state of the network can be represented using 0-1 vector δ = (δ1, δ2, … δm). The kth 
component of δ equals 1 if edge k is working and is 0 if failed. Assuming edges fail 
independently, the probability of a given state δ is 
    =p )δ  ∏
=
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m
k
kk
kk pp
1
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 Define the 0-1 variable Ist(δ), which equals 1 precisely when the sub-network of 
operational edges k (having δk = 1) contains an s-t path. Then the two-terminal reliability 
is given by 
                              (4.1) ∑
=
=
D
stst PIGR
δ
δδ )()()(
where D is the set of all network states. Even though it’s conceptually simple, the state-
space approach is impractical because |D| = 2m and the computation time and cost 
increase exponentially with the network size.  
 
We now illustrate the approach in a network with four nodes and five edges shown in 
Figure 4.1.  
 
 
 
           X 
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           Y 
 
        Figure 4.1 A Sample Bridge Network 
 
It is obvious that the network contains a s-t path if at most one edge fails, or any two 
edges other than {1, 2}, {1, 5}, {4, 5} fail. On the other hand, for three or more edge 
failures, the network fails unless the failed edges are {1, 3, 4} or {2, 3, 5}. Thus the two-
terminal reliability can be given as 
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  Rst(G) = p1p2p3p4p5 + q1p2p3p4p5 + p1q2p3p4p5 + p1p2q3p4p5 + p1p2p3q4q5 + 
  p1p2p3p4q5 + q1p2q3p4p5 + q1p2p3q4p5 + p1q2q3p4p5 + p1q2p3q4p5 + 
  p1q2p3p4q5 + p1p2q3q4p5 + p1p2q3p4q5 + q1p2q3q4p5 + p1q2q3p4q5 
 
Substituting qk = 1 – pk into the above equation, and simplifying, we get, 
 Rst(G) = p1p2p3p4p5 - p1p2p3p5 - p1p2p4p5 - p1p3p4p5 + p1p3p5 + p1p4 + p2p5  
 
Although as many as 55 terms could have resulted from performing these substitutions, a 
good deal of cancellation occurred in producing the above expression.  
 
Since only states δ with Ist(δ) = 1 contribute to Equation (4.1), it is unnecessary to 
examine all states of D, except for those containing the above expressions. It is therefore 
appropriate to focus directly on the simple s-t paths {P1, P2, …, Pk} of G.  
 
Define Ei as the event that all edges in path Pi operate. Then the two-terminal reliability is 
the probability that at least one such event occurs, or  
 Rst(G) = P(E1 U E2 U…U Ek)      (4.2) 
 
The two-terminal network reliability can be alternatively formulated using the minimal s-
t edge disconnecting sets, or cutsets of G. An s-t edge disconnecting set is minimal if it 
does not contain any other edge disconnecting set separating s and t. Indeed, suppose that 
the s-t cutsets are {C1, C2, …, Cr} and let Fj be the event that all edges in cutset Cj fail. 
Then the two-terminal unreliability Ust(G) is given by 
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    Ust(G) = 1- Rst(G) = P(F1 U F2 U…U Fr)   (4.3) 
 
The events Ei in Equation (4.2) are not in general disjoint, nor are the events Fi in 
Equation (4.3). However, there are other standard methods for evaluating the probability 
of the union of the events. 
 
Another way of viewing state-space enumeration emerges from the binary nature of the 
states assumed by each edge. Rather than fully specifying the states of all m edges at 
once, we can instead select a particular edge e∈E and condition on the status of e, either 
perfect (pe = 1) or failed (pe = 0). We obtain a new system denoted G/e in which edge e is 
perfect in the first case, and another new system G – e in which e is failed for the second 
case. This produces the pivotal decomposition formula: 
 Rst(G) = peRst(G/e) + (1 – pe)Rst(G - e)   (4.4) 
 
This formula shows how reliability calculations for a given network can be decomposed 
into those for two smaller networks, G/e and G – e.  While conditioning, or factoring, in 
turn every possible edge just reproduces state-space enumeration, there are circumstances 
in which not all edges need to be considered for factoring. In fact, by judiciously 
selecting the edges for factoring, substantial computational saving can be achieved. 
 
4.3.2 Inclusion-Exclusion 
Using the principle of inclusion and exclusion, equation (4.2) can be expanded as 
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The intersection of event A and B is indicated by the juxtaposition of AB. Each term in 
this expansion is easy to calculate base on the independence assumption. However, there 
are 2k – 1 terms to appear, hence the computation time increases exponentially with the 
number of given paths.  
 
For the sample network in Figure 4.1, there are three simple s-t paths. 
 P1: 1-4  P2: 2-5  P3: 1-3-5 
Thus, P(E1) = p1p4, P(E2) = p2p5, P(E3) = p1p3p5, P(E1E2) = p1p2p4p5, P(E1E3) = p1p3p4p5, 
P(E2E3) = p1p2p3p5, P(E1E2E3) = p1p2p3p4p5.  
 
Application of the inclusion-exclusion method then produces the expression as follows, 
Rst(G)  = P(E1) + P(E2) + P(E3) - P(E1E2) - P(E1E3) - P(E2E3) + P(E1E2E3) 
 = p1p4 + p2p5 + p1p3p5 - p1p2p4p5 - p1p3p4p5 - p1p2p3p5 + p1p2p3p4p5 
 
The topological formula of Satyanarayana and Prabhakar [34] is the most efficient 
method based on the inclusion-exclusion approach, although the number of terms in the 
reduced expression can still grow rapidly with the problem size. A reduced inclusion-
exclusion formula for RK(G) holds in directed networks. Boesch et al. [35] discussed 
various combinatorial interpretations of the formula for RK(G). 
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 4.3.3 Disjoint Product 
Another way to calculate the probability of the union of events in Equation (4.2) is to 
decompose E1 U E2 U…U Ek into a union of events that are disjoint. Specifically we can 
express 
 Rst(G)  = P(E1 U E2 U…U Ek)  
  = P )...... 1321321211 kk EEEEEEEEEE −UUU( EU   
where iE  denotes the complement of event Ei. Since the compound events above are 
pairwise disjoint, 
 )...(...)()()()( 1321321211 kkst EEEEEPEEEPEEPEPGR −++++=   
This disjoint-products method involves adding only k probabilities. However, the 
calculation of each constituent probability is generally involved. It is also important to 
emphasize that the efficacy of this method can be highly dependent on the specific 
ordering given to the events Ei. 
 
A number of methods [36-37] have been proposed to carry out the disjoint-products 
method, varying in their specific details but following the overall strategy. Typically the 
paths Pi are first ordered by non-decreasing length and then processed in turn to generate 
a number of terms disjoint with one another and those previously generated. In general, 
the number of generated terms can grow rapidly with the number of given paths k. In 
particular, the disjoint-products method can be carried out efficiently, in terms of k, for 
the all-terminal reliability problem in directed networks (a nondenenerate linear system). 
No such efficient method is known for calculating the two-terminal reliability problem. 
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 4.3.4 Factoring 
The inclusion-exclusion and disjoint-products techniques are based on a given 
enumeration of the s-t paths. The factoring method does not require knowledge of these 
paths but instead concentrates on the state of an individual edge. Application of the 
pivotal decomposition Equation (4.4) creates two sub-problems with smaller size. If the 
decomposition were simply reapplied to each such sub-problem, the approach would not 
be better than state-enumeration. Crucial to this approach is the possibility that certain of 
generated sub-problems might be reduced in size using simple probabilistic rules. 
 
Some basic rules of reduction are presented now. Two edges e = (i, k) and f = (i, k) 
joining the same two nodes in a directed network G are called parallel edges. A parallel 
reduction replaces two parallel edges, having probabilities pe and pf, by a single edge 
having probability 1 – (1 – pe)(1 – pf) = pe + pf - pepf. Two edges e = (i, j) and f = (j, k) are 
called series edges if these are the only two edges incident with node j.  If j ≠ s, t then a 
series reduction replaces the two series edges by a single edge having reliability pepf. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates these two reliability-preserving reductions, which are valid in view 
of the independence of edge failures. Also illustrated is a more general two-neighbor 
reduction, applicable if j ≠ s, t.   
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Figure 4.2. Probabilistic Rules of Reduction 
 
A network G is two-terminal series parallel if it can be reduced to a single edge (s, t) by 
repeatedly applying series and parallel reductions. In such a case, the two-terminal 
reliability is simply the reliability appearing on the final edge, and efficient algorithms 
exist for identifying and carrying out the appropriate reductions. More generally, the 
application of series and parallel reductions to G will leave a network more complex than 
a single edge. At this point, an edge can be selected for conditioning and the pivotal 
decomposition formula can be applied, yielding two new sub-problems. Series and 
parallel reductions are applied to these sub-problems for as long as possible, at which 
point pivotal decomposition can again be invoked. This alternating strategy of pivotal and 
applying reliability-preserving reductions constitutes the factoring algorithm. 
 
For a directed network G, factoring on an edge e out of s, or into t, is especially helpful. 
The system G/e will have a topological interpretation, since it is the network obtained 
from G by deleting edge e and merging its endpoints. While Equation (4.4) remains valid 
for any edge, unless the choice of edge for factoring is suitably restricted, G/e will not 
necessarily be equivalent to the network obtained from G by contracting the edge. This is 
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 clearly seen in the network of Figure 4.1, since contraction of edge 3 would produce the 
spurious path 2-4 in Figure 4.3(a). On the other hand, contraction of edge 1 produces the 
series-parallel network shown in Figure 2.3(b) and its reliability is easily calculated as 
 
 Rst(G) = (p2p5 + p3p5 - p2p3p5) + p4 - (p2p5 + p3p5 -p2p3p5) p4 
 
 
 
                s 
               4 
   1      4     
  s      t      2         3         t 
   2      5 
                5 
 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.3. Contraction of an Edge in Fig 4.1, Using (a) e = 3 and (b) e = 1 
 
Also G - e is accurately represented by the network of Figure 4.1 with edge 1 removed. 
Since edge 3 and 4 are then irrelevant, they can be removed and Rst(G - e) = p2p5. As a 
result of factoring on a single edge the two-terminal reliability of G is determined as 
 Rst(G) = p2 Rst(G/e) + (1 - p1)Rst(G - e) 
 = p1p4 + p2 p5 + p1p3p5 - p1p2p3p5- p1p2p4p5- p1p3p4p5 + p1p2p3p4p5 
 
The factoring approach was first applied to directed networks by Nazakawa [38]. 
Reliability algorithms for directed networks that incorporate factoring, together with 
probabilistic reduction rules, were implemented [39-40]. Johnson [41] and Wood [42] 
discussed the application of the factoring approach to a variety of network reliability 
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 problems, in particular the k-terminal and all-terminal reliability problems for undirected 
networks. 
4.3.5 Fault Tree Analysis 
The technique of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the estimation of the frequency of 
occurrence of an event was formalized in 1962 at Bell Laboratories.    
 
FTA is a very useful and popular method for analyzing complex system reliability. The 
fault tree itself is a graphic representation of the Boolean failure logic associated with the 
development of a particular system failure (the TOP event) to basic failures (primary 
events). For example, the TOP event could be the failure of a nuclear power plant 
guidance control system during its operation with the primary events being the failures of 
individual guidance control system components.  
 
FTA can be a valuable design tool. It can identify potential accidents in a system design 
and can help eliminate costly design changes and retrofits. FTA can also be a diagnostic 
tool. One can predict with it the most likely causes of system failures in the case of 
system breakdown. 
 
The fault trees are a special case of decision trees and contain logical gates, (for example, 
AND, OR, NOT, NOR, NAND, k-out-of-n) and symbols of top end primary events. The 
goal of fault tree construction is to model the system conditions that can result in the 
undesired event. Before construction of the fault tree, a thorough understanding of the 
system is acquired. In fact, a system description should be a part of the analysis 
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 documentation. The analyst must carefully define the undesired event under 
consideration, called the "top event".   
FTA can involve the following steps: 
• System definition 
• Fault tree construction 
• Qualitative analysis 
• Quantitative analysis 
 
System definition combines the analysis objectives with information about the systems. 
The analysis objectives guide the selection of TOP events. Boundary conditions define 
physical and analytical bounds associated with a TOP event and, together with a 
statement of the TOP event, constitute a problem definition. 
 
Fault trees are constructed for each of the TOP events based on the system definition 
step. Operator failures are included in the fault trees. The potential for operator acts of 
commission is not explicitly included in the fault trees but is indicated in the appropriate 
basic component failures. 
 
The qualitative analysis includes determining system failure modes-called minimal cut 
sets-for each fault tree. The minimal cut sets are used as input to the quantitative analysis, 
and they provide structural importance information about basic events (component and 
human failures). The most structurally important basic events are those that are one-event 
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 cut sets; the next most important basic events are those in the largest number of two-
event cut sets, and so forth. 
 
In many instances, it is not necessary to determine all minimal cut sets for a TOP event. 
If there are many low-order minimal cut sets (cut sets containing small numbers of basic 
events), these cut sets will usually dominate the system failure probability, and higher-
order cut sets do not need to be determined.  
 
The quantitative analysis step includes determining TOP event reliability characteristics 
from the minimal cut sets and the component failure characteristics assuming that all-
component failures and repairs are independent. Four quantitative reliability 
characteristics were of interest in the utility system study: 
• System unavailability 
• Expected number of system failures 
• Average system downtime 
• Component importance 
 
The system unavailability at a given time is the probability that the system is in the failed 
state at that time. The expected number of system failures is the expected number of 
times that a system failure will occur over a time interval. The average system downtime 
(for repairable systems) is the quotient of system unavailability and system failure rate. 
component importance estimates the fraction of time that a component failure is 
contributing to system failure, given the system is failed. 
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 4.4  Computational Complexity of Reliability Analysis 
Reliability analysis problems are more closely aligned with counting problems where the 
objective is to determine the number of configurations of a particular type. The minimum 
cardinality pathset problem associated with the k-terminal problem is the problem of 
finding a minimum cardinality Steiner Tree. Rosenthal [24] firstly showed that reliability 
analysis for k-terminal networks are all NP-hard. The minimum cardinality pathset 
problem associated with the 2-terminal problem is the problem of finding a shortest (s, t) 
path. It was first proved by Valiant [25] that the functional, rational, and point estimate 
reliability analysis problems are all NP-hard for the 2-terminal networks. For all-terminal 
measure it is necessary to analyze direct and undirected networks separately. The 
minimum cardinality cutset problem is the problem of finding a minimum cardinality s-
directed cut. Provan and Ball [26] proved that the reliability analysis problems for the 
directed and undirected all-terminal measure are NP-hard. 
 
A standard source for information on the computational complexity of algorithms is the 
book of Garey and Johnson [74]. More specific information on the complexity of network 
reliability problems and NP-complete problems can be found from [4, 24-25]. 
 
The usual definition of NP employs a model of nondeterministic computation, the 
nondeterministic Turing machine. Turing machines that halt either accept or reject their 
input; however, there may be a number of different nondeterministic choices that would 
lead to acceptance. For this reason, Valiant [76, 77] explored the extension to counting 
Turing machines, which act just like nondeterministic Turing machines, but upon 
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 acceptance print the number of different computations which would lead to acceptance. 
Then #P (read "sharp P" or "number P") is the class of functions which can be computed 
by counting Turing machines in polynomial time. Naturally the counting version of any 
problem in NP is in #P; however, the counting Turing machine is apparently a nontrivial 
extension of the nondeterministic Turing machine, as there is no obvious way to produce 
the number of accepting computations just knowing the existence of one.  
 
Complexity results can be obtained by transforming known NP-complete problem and 
#P-complete problems into the reliability problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
MODELING RELIABILITY OF INTEGRATED NETWORKS (MORIN) 
 
5.1 MORIN Method 
AGM has been rigorously proved as a corollary of the general theorem on complex 
system decomposition. Some other self-proclaimed more efficient algorithms are derived 
from it. The AGM method may be extended to solve problems in integrated systems 
where the software in a node has a constant failure rate [2]. However the computational 
time increases exponentially with the number of links. Another explicit method namely 
NPR/T [7], which was derived from AGM, is much simpler and more direct, and the 
computational time increases linearly with the number of links. But this method can yield 
incorrect results in some cases involving undirected networks [6]. At any rate, neither 
method covers network reliability problems when software failure follows different 
distributions.  
 
The AGM method considers each link in the network (with failure-prone links and nodes) 
as a series combination of a perfect node and the link with modified reliability. However, 
the computing time increases exponentially with the number of links.  
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 The approach for MOdeling Reliability for Integrated Networks (MORIN) adopts the 
strategy of replacing a network having unreliable nodes with an equivalent network 
having completely reliable nodes except the source node s.  Considering link i and its 
terminal node j,  the link in the equivalent network has a modified reliability αjβi.  In the 
equivalent network, the failures of all links are not necessarily s-independent, but failures 
of a link and other links that are connected to uncommon terminal nodes are still 
independent. For each node j (in event Si) except the source node s, group its incoming 
directed links, and then compute R without Boolean simplification. 
∏−
=
=
1
1
, }{){
n
j
jissshi SPSP αα      (5.1) 
 
where Si,j is operational links 1, 2, … Kj directed into node j on event tree i, then  
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If there are no links directed into node j specified by Si, then P{Si, j}=1. Let links 1, 2, 
…Nj directed into node j be specified as failed and links Nj+1, Nj+2, … Nj+Kj be 
specified as operational, then 
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Let Kj = 0, then links 1, 2, … Nj have failed in the equivalent network if and only if node j 
has failed and all Nj links are operational, or all Nj links have failed and node j is 
operational, or both node j and all Nj links failed. Since the probability expression for 
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 node j does not reflect the fact that the failure of this node thereafter brings with its 
failures of links incident to this node, then: 
   for K∏
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, )1(1){ βαααα j = 0 (5.4) 
 
Since the Si are mutually exclusive events, the node-pair reliability is the summation of 
the probabilities of all success disjoint events, thus 
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As showed above, the MORIN approach can be summarized as follows 
• Find all mutual exclusive disjointed path set from the source node to sink 
node of the corresponding network, denoted as event trees {S1, S2, …Si}  
• On each event tree Si, for each node j except the source node s, group its 
incoming directed links specified by Si,j  
• Denote Si,j as operational links 1, 2, … Kj directed into node j, then 
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• Compute the P{Si, j} by considering failed and operational links for node j  
• Combine above four steps and the Equation (5.1)(5.3)(5.4)(5.5) to get the 
reliability of entire network.  
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 The pseudo-codes of MORIN can be presented as follows: 
 
1. MORIN_Events (G, s, t)  
// find all event trees {S1, S2, …Si} 
// where source node is s, sink node is t and G = (V, E) 
a. Initialize the network model 
d(s) ← 0 : π(s) ← NIL  // node s is the source node 
S(i) ← {s}    // Each event tree i includes source node s 
Path_Set(i) ←  NIL   // Path-set is empty in event i 
Q ← {s} 
For each node u ∈ V[G] – s 
 Do  d(u) ← ∞   // d(u) is the distance from u to s 
       π(u) ← NIL   // π(u) is the predecessor node of u 
       color(u) ← white  // node u has the not been discovered 
 
b. Iterations 
While Q ≠ NIL 
  Do  u ← Head(Q) 
   For each v ∈ Adj(u)  
    Do  if   color(v) = white 
    then  Path_Finding(v) 
  if   π(t) = v     // A s-t path is found 
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   then S(i) ← S(i) + v 
   Path(i) ← Path_Set(i) 
   i ← i + 1 
 
Path_Finding(v) 
color(v) = gray 
 d(v) ←  d(u) + 1 
  π(v) ←  u 
 Path_Set(i) ←  Path_Set(i) + (u, v)    
 for each w ∈ Adj(v)  
Do  if   color(w) = white 
   then  π(w) ←  v 
  Path_Set(i) ←  Path_Set(i) + (u, v)    
   Path_Finding(w) 
Color(v) = black 
Q ← ENQUEUE(Q, v)   //Add v to head of the Queue 
 
2. Event_RCal [S(i)] 
// Calculate the network reliability R based on generated event trees/path sets and 
// reliability of each node and link along the event paths. 
R = 0 
for each path of path_set (i) on event tree S(i) 
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  Si, j ← group incoming directed links of node j on event i 
P(Si, j) = 1  // if Si, j does not specify any links directed into node j  
  
While node Queue of Si ≠ NIL 
 For all operational links into node j  
  Po(Si, j) =  ∏
=
jK
i
ij
1
βα
For all failed links into node j 
 Pf(Si, j) = (  ∏
=
−+−
jn
i
ijj
1
)1()1 βαα
 P(Si) =  )()( ,, jifjios SPSPα
DEQUEUE (Q, j) // remove node j from the node queue of event S(i) 
 R ← R + P(Si) 
 
Prior to designing or evaluating the reliability/availability a network or an end-to-end 
solution, it is essential to model the reliability/availability of corresponding systems that 
normally comprise of hardware subsystems and software subsystems and are usually 
configured under a complex architecture. Additionally, redundancies at various levels 
(such as chipset level, board level, system box-level) are typically deployed in complex 
systems to achieve high availability (HA) in industry to meet practical application 
demands and requirements.  This type of issues can be addressed by the simplified 
methodology and modeling tool (SAMOT) introduced in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SIMPLIFIED NETWORK AVAILABILITY MODELING 
  
This chapter proposes a simplified methodology that incorporates Markov analysis and 
Reliability Block Diagram methodologies to model and analyze the availability of a 
typical end-to-end solution consisting of multiple complex component systems, where the 
failure of each component system is attributed to software failures and hardware failures. 
The methodology and computational tool - Simplified Availability Modeling Tool 
(SAMOT) is introduced. The application of SAMOT to 1:1 system redundancy, which is 
common in the networking industry, is the focus of this study. The end-to-end availability 
is modeled and computed based on the corresponding signaling path and bearer path 
since the paths can transverse through different component systems. It is observed that 
SAMOT is very accurate (compared with the Markov analysis) when applied to 1:1 
redundant systems under various system parameter sets with high switchover coverage. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
High availability (HA) with its attendant higher requirements for system performance has 
increasingly become an important feature for suppliers of computer network equipment 
to communication service providers. Usually system failures are attributed to its hardware 
components or/and software components. The algorithms and approaches of modeling 
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 and analyzing the availability of a communication network comprised of numerous, 
complex topology systems is the subject of much research [119]. However, very few HA 
modeling tools for complex networks are commonly accepted and applied in industry. A 
number of vendors have provided some commercial software applications (Relex1, 
SelfReliant2, MEADEP3, SHARPE4, RealSoft5, etc.) for reliability modeling and analysis 
of complex systems. But adequate training and relevant experience in corresponding 
fields are required, in addition to the software license fee or purchase cost.  
 
This chapter introduces a simplified interactive modeling tool that integrates Markov 
analysis and Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) methodologies for computing the 
availability of a typical end-to-end network solution where a 1:1 system-level redundancy 
is installed in some component systems. The Markov analysis is approximated by the 
Defect Per Million (DPM) model [116], and the RBD method is implemented by SHARC 
[117].  
 
Definitions 
DPM (defects per million): the number of calls lost per million calls attempted. It consists 
of two elements – call-blocked DPM and call-dropped DPM. To complete a 
communication transaction, the network must establish some paths (not necessarily 
physical circuits), e.g. a signaling path and a bearer path for voice packets, a signaling 
                                                          
1 Relex is the registered trademark of Relex Software Corporation. 
2 SelfReliant is the registered trademark of GoAhead Software Inc. 
3 MEADEP is the registered trademark of SoHaR Inc. 
4 SHARP is the registered trademark of  
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5 RealSoft is the registered trademark of RealSoft Pte Ltd. 
 path and a data path for data packets. Usually when a call is blocked, subscribers cannot 
make new calls due to the fact that there is at least one failure along the signaling path; 
whereas when an existing call is dropped, at least one failure occurs along the bearer path 
of the network.  
 
DPM = (1 - Availability) x 106 
Total DPM = DPMcall-blocked + DPMcall-dropped 
attemptedcallsofNumber
droppedcallsofNumberblockedcallsofNumber 610)( ×+=
 
End-to-end availability: the probability that a customer can complete the communication 
to its destination. Since a signaling path and a voice path as well as a data path may pass 
through different network components, the end-to-end availability for each type of path 
can vary and therefore needs to be identified and studied at the path level. 
 
1:1 Redundancy: there is one redundant unit for every unit that is required for full 
operation. Redundancy can improve availability by orders of magnitude while keeping 
the MTBF and MTTR of each unit the same. The effectiveness of redundancy is highly 
dependent on the switchover coverage and switchover time. 
 
Switchover Coverage: the probability that a failure is success-fully detected, isolated, and 
recovered by a higher-level fault-management mechanism. In case of active/standby 
88 
 redundancy, switchover coverage is dependent on the fault detection on the active side, 
the fault detection on the standby side, and the reliability of the switching mechanism.  
Switchover coverage = Active fault coverage ×  Standby fault coverage 
where active fault coverage is the probability of detecting a fault on the active side as 
well as having the switching mechanism operational at the same time; standby fault 
coverage is the probability of detecting a fault on the standby side.  In the case of load-
sharing redundancy, the switchover coverage is dependent upon only one fault-detection 
coverage because there is no inactive standby side. 
 
Switchover Time: the time from when a failure is detected in an operating component to 
the time when the affected traffic is switched over to the redundant component. 
 
More detailed definitions can be obtained in [116, 118]. 
 
6.2 Problem Description 
A typical voice-over-internet protocol (VoIP) solution includes different functional 
segments -- access equipment, aggregation device, core router, LAN switch, edge system, 
etc. -- as shown in Figure 6.1. Each segment can encompass one or more systems. The 
end-to-end (signaling, voice, or data) traffic has to pass through most (if not all) segments 
to complete the transmission. The customer premium equipment (CPE) is usually located 
at customer side and its availability is affected by many non-system-reliability factors 
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 (such as, process-related failures, human errors); thus, it is not considered in the end-to-
end availability. 
 
  
 
Figure 6.1. Segments of A Typical VoIP Solution 
 
The end-to-end availability is determined by availabilities of component systems and 
network links along a given path. Furthermore, the system availability is attributed to the 
availability of system hardware and software, configuration, fault management 
mechanisms, and operation, administration and maintenance (OA&M). System hardware 
usually consists of an egress line card, an ingress line card, a chassis, processor card, dual 
power supply, and some other feature cards. System software normally includes the 
operation system software running on server platform or processor card and application 
software running on processor card or feature cards, depending on the specific system 
configuration. The fault management function can be performed by the monitoring/alarm 
system, online diagnosis system, etc. The planned outage comprises of software upgrades 
and hardware upgrades in this discussion.  
 
Board-level and system-level redundancy can be deployed to improve the system and 
network availability. The system redundancy effectiveness [116] is mainly determined by 
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 the redundancy type (active/standby or load-sharing), 1:1 or 1:N redundancy, switchover 
coverage, and switchover time. 
 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the RBD of a sample system.  
 
Ingress
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Control
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Control
Card
Feature
Card 1
Feature
Card 1
Feature
Card 2
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Card 2
Power
Power
Software SoftwareUpgrade
Egress
Card
   
 
Figure 6.2. Reliability Block Diagram of A Sample System 
 
The proposed modeling tool is to depict and predict the availability for the signaling path 
and bearer path of a typical network solution comprised of software-hardware systems 
with 1:1 redundancy at the box-level, considering both un-scheduled outages and 
scheduled outages. 
 
6.3 Methodologies and Tools 
6.3.1 Common Methodologies 
The Markov modeling method is advantageous in terms of capturing the component 
failover behavior and fault coverage probability with states and state transitions. However 
the Markov modeling tool may be difficult to apply in the field. It can be complicated and 
computationally intractable when a system or network has a complex topology. RBD is 
one of the most commonly used methods in modeling serial-parallel system reliability. 
But it does not have the power to handle large networks with a complex topology. 
91 
  
6.3.2 Commonly-used Tools 
The DPM model and SHARC are two practical tools for modeling system and network 
availability in industry. The DPM model was originally created to approximate the 
Markov method for calculating the availability of a network with a serial-parallel 
topology. Since software and hardware components of the redundant systems can have 
very different availability metrics such as MTBF, MTTR, switchover time and planned 
outages, the DPM modeling tool is not capable of taking the system box level redundancy 
schemes into consideration. The SHARC [117] applies the RBD method to compute the 
availability metric of a simplex system, however it is not capable of identifying the 
unavailability (downtime) contributed by the switchover time and imperfect switchover 
coverage for a redundant system. So an improved reliability block diagram (IRBD) is 
created, where several blocks are added to describe the switchover coverage and 
switchover time for active/standby redundant systems.  
 
6.3.3 SAMOT Tool 
The SAMOT calibrates and integrates the above two methodologies/tools (Markov/DPM 
and RBD/SHARC) and incorporates the availability design parameters into two inter-
active modules [119] to model the end-to-end network availability. A sample network 
solution architecture (as shown in Figure 7.5), where each Super POP element deploys 
the 1:1 system redundancy, will be studied in Section 7.2.  
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 The SAMOT interactive tool consists of a Main module and a Redundancy module. Each 
module is a separate spreadsheet file, which provides some input and act as output of the 
other file. The Main module models the availability of all component systems of the 
network, with each system on one sheet. If there is redundancy involved, the availability 
of the redundant systems is computed on the same sheet with input data categorized into 
planned outage and unplanned outage from the Redundancy module. The Main module 
calculates the availability of various end-to-end network paths as well.  
 
The Redundancy module models the 1:1 redundant system availability by approximating 
the unplanned and planned outages resulted from major hardware and software failures. 
The output of the Redundancy module is the input of the Main module when calculating 
the availability of redundant systems. The Main module calculates the unplanned outage 
of hardware and software, and the planned outage of hardware and software of a single 
system as the input of the Redundancy module when corresponding system redundancy is 
involved. Figure 6.3 illustrates the interactive relationship between the two modules. 
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Figure 6.3. Interactive Modules in SAMOT 
 
Since the hardware and software usually have quite different MTBF and MTTR 
availability attributes, their failures need to be considered separately. The IRBD in Figure  
6.4 captures the major failure modes of the 1:1 redundant hardware-software systems. 
Those failure modes and parameters need to be preliminarily determined by design 
engineers or users of the tool before being applied in the SAMOT tool. 
HW
switchover
time
HW active
coverage
fails
HW
standby
coverage
fails
P(HW)
S(HW)
SW
switchover
time
SW active
coverage
fails
SW
standby
coverage
fails
P(SW)
S(SW)
  
Figure 6.4. IRBD for 1:1 R in SAMOT’s Redundancy Module 
 
In Figure 6.4, the first four blocks illustrate the hardware failure modes for the 1:1 
redundant systems.  
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 • The “HW switchover time” block reflects the short duration outage that results 
from the switchover.  
• The “HW active coverage fails” block depicts the system outage when the system 
fails to detect hardware failure on the active side or successfully detects the 
hardware failure on the active side but fails to switch over to the standby side. 
• The “HW standby coverage fails” block describes the outage when an active side 
hardware failure is detected and traffic is being switched to the standby side, but 
the standby side hardware has failed and remained undetected.  
• The parallel “P(HW)” and “S(HW)” blocks are to model the hardware system in 
the primary unit and secondary unit (sometimes called active and standby unit) 
with perfect coverage and Zero switchover time. The system outage happens 
when hardware on both sides fail. 
Note: The standby coverage failure may not bring network outage immediately, should 
be in the protection path with S(HW) block. SAMOT adopts the IRBD in Figure 6.4 to 
simplify the approximated computation. 
 
The software failure modes are taken into account similarly. 
 
The manual failover tests can be considered to reduce outage from the standby coverage 
failure and improve the redundancy effectiveness. The impact of this change is trivial 
under the following experimental availability parameter settings. 
 
95 
 Markov analysis is capable of exhaustively enumerating the failure states and their 
transitions; it is used to verify the correctness and accuracy of the Redundancy module of 
SAMOT for modeling the availability of a 1:1 R system.  
 
Figure 6.5 is the Markov failure state transition diagram for the 1:1 redundant system. 
Among the 13 major states of the 1:1 redundant system, State 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 11 
(double circled) represent failure modes. The symbol on each arc connecting one node to 
the other is the transition probability between the two states. 
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Figure 6.5. Markov Diagram for Failure Mode Transitions of 1:1 Software-hardware System Redundancy 
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 Variables 
c1   = Coverage factor for active unit 
c2   = Coverage factor for standby unit 
λH  = Hardware failure rate of individual unit 
λs   = Software failure rate of individual unit  
βH   = Hardware switchover rate from active to standby 
βs   = Software switchover rate from active to standby 
µ1H   = Hardware repair rate of non-service-affecting failures 
µ1s   = Software repair rate of non-service-affecting failures 
µ2H   = Hardware repair rate of service-affecting failures 
µ2s   = Software repair rate of service-affecting failures 
 
State Descriptions 
1  All hardware work 
2  Hardware of the active unit failed, detected 
3  Hardware of the standby unit has taken over 
4  Hardware of 2nd unit failed while recovering the failed unit 
5  Software of 2nd unit failed while recovering the failed unit 
6  Software of the active unit failed, detected 
7  Software of the standby unit has taken over 
8  Hardware of the standby unit failed, detected 
9  Software of the standby unit failed, detected 
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 10  Hardware of the active unit failed, can not switch to standby 
11  Software of the active unit failed, can not switch to standby 
12  Hardware of the standby unit failed, undetected 
13  Software of the standby unit failed, undetected 
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CHAPTER 7 
COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS 
 
To demonstrate the applications of the proposed MORIN and SAMOT approaches and 
techniques for reliability and availability analysis of integrated networks, this chapter 
contains some computational experiments and results. 
 
7.1 MORIN Examples 
The two-terminal communication (e.g. communicating from a source node to a target 
node) is the most common network operation. The k-terminal reliability and all-terminal 
reliability problems can be derived from the two-terminal reliability problems. To 
demonstrate the MORIN approach, two-terminal reliability examples are used. 
 
7.1.1 Sample Network 1 
Figure 7.1 is an example of a typical directed bridge network. Nodes 1 and 4 are the 
source and terminal nodes respectively. The two black dots inside each node represent the 
corresponding hardware component and software component of the node. 
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Figure 7.1 Sample Network 1 
 
The s-t reliability can be obtained with the 4 success events, as shown in Figure 7.2:  
98765,9856,695,58 4321 ==== SSSS , 
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Figure 7.2. Event-Tree Generated by the MORIN Algorithm for Sample Network 1 
 
Thus the symbolic expression of the reliability can be presented as, 
      (7.1) ∑ ∏∑ ==
= ==
4
1
4
2
,
4
1
1 }{}{
i j
ji
i
i SPSPR α
  = α1{(α2β5)(α4β8) + [(1-α2) + α2β5](α3β6)(α4β9) + (α2β5)(α3β6)[(1-α4)  
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    + α4β8](α4β9) + (α2β5)[(1-α3) + α3β6](α3β7)[(1-α4)+ α4β8](α4β9)} 
 = α1α2β5α4β8 + α1α3β6α4β9 (1-α2 + α2β5) + α1α2β5α3β6α4β9(1-α4 + α4β8) 
   + α1α2β5α3β7α4β9(1-α3 + α3β6)(1-α4 + α4β8) 
  = α1α2α4β5β8 + α1α2α3α4β5β6β9 + α1α3α4β6β9 - α1α2α3α4β6β9  
  + α1α2α3α4β5β6β8β9  + α1α2α3α4β5β6β7β9(1-α4 + α4β8) 
  = α1α2α4β5β8 + α1α3α4β6β9 + α1α2α3α4β5β6β9 -α1α2α3α4β6β9   
    + α1α2α3α4β5β6β8β9 + α1α2α3α4β5β6β7β8β9  
 = α1α2α4β5β8 + α1α3α4β6β9 + α1α2α3α4β6β9(β5 –1 + β5β8 + β5β7β8) 
 
A number of analytical models have been proposed to address the problem of software 
reliability measurement. According to the nature of the failure process and based on the 
failure history of the software, these approaches can be classified as Time Between 
Failures (TBF) Models, Failure Count Model, Fault Seeding Models, and Input Domain 
Based Models [18]. The most common TBF model assumes that the time between the  
(i-1)st failure and ith failure independently follows a distribution whose parameters depend 
on the number of faults remaining in the program during the interval, embedded faults are 
independent and of equal probability of exposure, faults are removed immediately after 
each occurrence, no new faults are introduced during correction. Unlike in a regular 
manufacturing system, where hardware failure rate increases with time and maintenance, 
it is expected that the successive failure times will get longer as faults are removed from 
the node software system.  
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 Since software fail only when they are executed, the calendar time doesn’t represent the 
time during which the software could fail. The utilization of the software inside node j ---
εj is used to compensate for the difference in the time domain. 
 
We will analyze the reliability and availability of networks integrated with software 
failures and imperfect nodes based on MORIN [31], where the times between software 
failures follow the TBF models. The directed bridge network as shown in Figure 7.1 is 
used as the example. Hardware failures in each node are assumed to follow Poisson 
process with the same rate λ1. Failure of each link also presumably follows the Poisson 
distribution with the same rate λ2. Jelinski Moranda (JM) De-Eutrophication Model is 
adopted as the software failure model. The software in each node of the integrated 
network is assumed to have the same utilization ε and follow the same stochastic failure 
process. 
 
JM De-Eutrophication Model is one of the earliest and probably the most commonly used 
model for assessing software reliability. It assumes that there are N software faults at the 
start of testing, and that each fault is independent of the others and equally likely to cause 
a failure during testing. A detected fault is removed with certainty in negligible time and 
no new faults are introduced during the debugging process. The software failure rate or 
the hazard function is assumed to be proportional to the current fault content of the 
program. It is expected that the successive failure times would become longer as faults 
are removed from the software system. Hence the hazard function during ti, the time 
between the (i-1)st and ith failure, is given by  
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  hs(ti) = Φ[N-(i-1)] ε, where Φ is a proportionality constant, ε is the software 
utilization coefficient. 
Thus Rs(t) = = e
∫−
t
s dh
e 0
)( δδ
-Φ(N -i+1)ε t 
tiN
dh
ssss eiNethtRthtf
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s εφ
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−
+−Φ=∫==  
 
In the bridge network, for the node software, based on the utilization ε, the operational 
probability is: 
   α1s= α2s= α3s= α4s= Rs(t) = e-Φ(N -i+1)εt 
For the node hardware, the operational probability is: 
  α1h = α2h = α3h = α4h = e  t1λ−
For the links, the operational probability is:  
 β5 = β6 = β7 = β8 = β9 =  te 2λ−
 
The terminal reliability from s to t between the (i-1)st and ith software failure is thus: 
 Rs-t = α1α2α4β5β8 + α1α3α4β6β9 + α1α2α3α4β6β9(β5 –1 + β5β8 + β5β7β8) 
        = α1sα1hα2sα2hα4sα4h β5β8 + α1sα1hα3sα3hα4sα4h β6β9  
+ α1sα1hα2sα2hα3sα3hα4sα4h (β5 + β5β8 + β5β7β8 -1) 
        = ete 13λ− -3Φ(N-i+1)εt te 22λ−  + ete 13λ− -3Φ(N-i+1)εt te 22λ−   
+ ete 14λ− -4Φ(N-i+1)εt ( + e  + e -1)  te 2λ− t22λ− t23 λ−
      = 2 ete 13λ− -3Φ(N-i+1)εt te 22λ−  + ete 14λ− -4Φ(N-i+1)εt ( e + e  + -1) t2λ− t22λ− te 23 λ−
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 Denote θ = -[λ1 + Φε(N - i + 1)]t, after the symbolic simplification,  
 Rs-t = 2 e  + ( e + e  + -1) tiN )]1([3 1 −−+− φελ te 22λ− tiNe )]1([4 1 −−+− φελ t2λ− t22λ− te 23 λ−
       =  2e3θ te 22λ− + e4θ te 2λ− + e4θ te 22λ−  + e4θ e - et23λ− 4θ 
 
From the above symbolic expression, it can be concluded that the reliability of the 
studied network follows a multivariate distribution that is usually used to describe a 
system consisting of multiple components with different failure distributions. 
Furthermore, the network reliability depends on the software utilization, software failure 
rate and hardware failure rate inside a node, the failure rate of a link, and the total fault 
number in the software in each node.  
 
7.1.2 Sample Network 2 
Figure 7.3 shows the other sample network where only source node s, sink node t, and 
links are labeled. 
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Figure 7.3 Sample Network 2 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7.4, there are seven mutual exclusive successful events generated 
by MORIN method: 
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  S1 = 148  S2 = 2691   S3 = 789261   S4 = 58621   
 S5 = 36941  S6 = 7893641   S7 = 586341  
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Figure 7.4. Event-Tree Generated by the MORIN Algorithm for Sample Network 2 
 
Similarly as in Sample network 1, the network reliability can be calculated through the 
symbolic computations following the proposed MORIN method. 
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 7.2  SAMOT Experiment Results? 
To demonstrate the SAMOT tool, some experiments are conducted with following basic 
important assumptions. 
• Operation, administration and maintenance (OA&M), as well as procedural 
errors, are not considered in the system and end-to-end availability modeling. 
• The data path availability is not demonstrated in the experiments since typical 
data does not require real time transmission, the HA requirements are lower. 
• Customer premium equipment (CPE) failures are not considered in the 
experiments. CPE is usually located on the customer side and is often mostly 
affected by non-product-quality-related failures in practice. 
• Link failures are negligible in the experiments due to the extremely high 
reliability of links (fiber trunk or cooper cable). 
• The end-to-end path does not include the Public Switch Telephone Network 
(PSTN) or other segments that the servers are connected to. In this sense, the end-
to-end path is semi-end to end. 
• To simplify the experiments, the operating system (OS) software and application 
software are integrated into a single software block in Redundancy Module (if not 
specified) albeit the OS software and application software usually fail with 
different distributions and should be considered separately when applicable. 
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? All experimental metrics showed in this section are intended as an illustration of the SAMOT tool only, 
and do not represent or imply actual reliability/availability configuration design and/or field performance of 
any product of any company. 
 7.2.1 Practical Networks 
The architecture of a practical network (as in Figure 7.5) and the corresponding modeling 
flowchart are illustrated in Figure 7.6 and 7.7 respectively. Figure 7.8 shows the signaling 
path and bearer path transverses different component systems in the sample network.  
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Figure 7.5. Architecture of A Sample Network with Redundancy 
 
 
Figure 7.6. Block Diagram of A Sample Baseline Network 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7. Modeling Flowchart for A Baseline Network 
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 To improve the availability of the end-to-end path, while considering the cost factor, 1:1 
box-level redundancy can be implemented in the critical SoftSwitch and less expensive 
LAN Switch and edge servers, as showed in Figure 7.8.  
 
A dynamic protocol such as hot standby router protocol (HSRP) or ICMP router 
discovery protocol (IRDP) runs between the redundant SoftSwitches in order to quickly 
populate the routing table to the standby unit when a network failure occurs [120].  
 
 
Figure 7.8. Block Diagram of A Sample Network with 1:1 System Redundancy 
 
Figure 7.9 is the flowchart of modeling availability of a network with 1:1 redundancy. 
 
 
Figure 7.9. Modeling Flowchart for A Network with 1:1 System Redundancy 
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 7.2.2 SAMOT Modeling Results 
7.2.2.1 System Availability 
We first apply the SAMOT tool to calculate the availability metrics of each individual 
system based on its internal system configuration and subsystem reliability.  
MTBF and MTTR of each subsystem are two basic availability parameters to compute 
the corresponding system availability. Switchover coverage and switchover time are 
another two important availability metrics if redundancies are involved. The first two 
“hours” columns in Table 7.1-7.5 are inputs of the SAMOT tool in order to compute the 
system availability and end-to-end network availability. MTBF is calculated according to 
the Bellcore standards, MTTR is estimated based on the system HA configurations and 
features as well as part staffing condition. The last four columns (from right of the table) 
are system availability metrics output from SAMOT. 
 
Table 7.1. Availability Metrics of Aggregation Device 
Component Description MTBF (hr) MTTR (hr) 
Annual 
Downtime 
(min) 
A (%) DPM (B) DPM (D) 
Aggre. Dev Chassis 674,310 4 3.235 99.9994 6.15 0.15 
Processor, with 1:1 R 128,152 2 1.167 99.9998 2.22 0.43 
CT3 Card 230,886 2 4.619 99.99912 8.79 0.47 
COC12 Card  172,604 2 6.156 99.99883 11.71 0.54 
Power, 1:1 load-sharing 
redundancy 158,228 2 0.143 99.99997 0.27 0.013 
OS Software 33,835 0.058 0.906 99.99983 1.724 1.478 
SW upgrade 4,380 0.058 9.599 99.99817 18.26 17.12 
Total Aggre. Device 61,097 3 25.825 99.99509 49.13 20.20 
Note: DPM(B) is the DPM for blocked calls  and DPM(D) is the DPM for dropped calls. 
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 Table 7.2. Availability Metrics of Core Router 
Component Description MTBF (hr) MTTR (hr) 
Annual 
Downtime 
(min) 
A (%) DPM (B) DPM (D) 
Core Router Chassis 297,137 4 7.518 99.99857 14.30 0.336 
Processor, w/ 1:1 R 108,304 2 2.283 99.99957 4.344 0.512 
Feature Card 272,584 2 0.077 99.99999 0.147 0.004 
Feature Card  422,115 2 0.050 99.99999 0.095 0.002 
Alarm Card 845,123 2 1.244 99.99976 2.366 0.059 
4OC3 Card 164,046 2 6.947 99.99868 13.22 1.783 
4OC12 Card  124,440 2 8.987 99.99829 17.10 1.880 
316,456 2 0.748 99.99999 0.142 0.006 
OS Software 33,835 0.251 3.905 99.99926 7.430 1.478 
SW upgrade 4,380 0.251 45.123 99.99142 85.85 17.12 
Total Core Router 20,687 3 76.208 99.98550 145.0 23.18 
Power, 1:1 load-sharing 
redundancy 
 
Table 7.3. Availability Metrics of SoftSwitch 
Component Description MTBF (hr) MTTR (hr) 
Annual 
Downtime 
(min) 
A (%) DPM (B) DPM (D) 
E-Switch HW, 1:1 box 
Redundancy 164,528 2 0.776 99.99854 1.458 0.099 
E-Switch IOS-R 18,039 0.108 0.111 99.99998 0.211 0.302 
Fru Server (1:1 R) 51,810 2 2.304 99.99956 4.384 0.210 
SoftSwitch Software 22,545 0.083 0.060 99.99999 0.114 0.302 
SW upgrade 4,380 0.083 0.458 99.99991 0.871 1.244 
Total SoftSwitch 428,568 3 3.700 99.99930 7.039 2.158 
Note: Power is not considered in this SoftSwitch model due to using the Central Office power. 
 
Table 7.4. Availability Metrics of LAN Switch 
Component Description MTBF (hr) MTTR (hr) 
Annual 
Downtime 
(min) 
A (%) DPM (B) DPM (D) 
LAN Switch Chassis 369,897 4 6.039 99.99885 11.49 0.270 
Processor Engine 1:1R 41,988 2 3.825 99.99927 7.277 0.485 
Switch Fabric Mod. 172,889 2 0.826 99.99984 1.571 0.071 
OS Software 18,039 0.058 0.185 99.99996 0.353 0.302 
Application Software 18,039 0.058 0.185 99.99996 0.353 0.302 
SW Upgrade 4,380 0.367 1.925 99.99963 3.663 1.244 
Power, w/ 1:1 Load- 
Sharing R 316,456 2 0.075 99.99999 0.142 0.006 
Line Card 93,457 2 12.947 99.99754 24.63 3.307 
Connector  94,684 2 12.802 99.99756 24.36 3.299 
9 Slot Fan w/ 1:1 Load 
Sharing R 740,740 2 0.028 99.99999 0.054 0.001 
Total LAN Switch 40,592 3 38.837 99.99261 73.89 9.289 
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 Table 7.5. Availability Metrics of Edge Server 1 
Component Description MTBF (hr) MTTR (hr) 
Annual 
Downtime 
(min) 
A (%) DPM (B) DPM (D) 
Server1 Chassis 45,212 3 37.780 99.99281 71.88 2.212 
DSP Module 594,126 2 3.430 99.99935 6.526 4.824 
DMM Modem with 
Feature Card 63,404 2 18.240 99.99653 34.70 5.528 
OS Software 10,549 0.192 5.232 99.99901 9.953 4.740 
Software Upgrade 4,380 0.350 29.399 99.99441 55.93 11.42 
Power, with 1:1 Load 
Sharing R 600,000 2 1.986 99.99962 3.778 0.250 
Total Edge Server 1 16,408 3 96.066 99.98172 182.8 28.97 
 
Further details of the model can be referred to Appendices. 
 
7.2.2.2 Availability of 1:1 Redundant Systems 
Inside a system box, it is difficult to deploy redundancy on the ingress card and egress 
card to eliminate the single points of failure (SPF); the system chassis is always a SPF.  
The effect of SPFs usually accumulates to be the bottleneck of achieving the carrier class 
(five 9s) network availability. Thus to better improve the overall end-to-end availability 
per customer’s HA requirements, 1:1 active/standby redundancies at the box-level is 
usually suggested to some critical systems or inexpensive systems in addition to board-
level redundancy for key components in the system. SAMOT can accurately model the 
availability of a complex hardware-software system with redundancy schemes. 
 
Since a Markov model is capable of exhaustively enumerating the failure states and their 
transitions, it is used here to verify the correctness and accuracy of the SAMOT tool for 
calculating the availability of a 1:1 redundant system. The Bellcore Systems Reliability 
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 Analysis Software (SRAS) Ver 2.2 (referring to Appendix) is used as the Markov 
modeling tool in this chapter.   
 
Table 7.6. Comparisons of Availability Modeling Results on Unplanned Outages of 1:1 Redundant System 
by SAMOT and Markov 
Systems A(Soft-S) (%) 
A(LAN-S) 
(%) 
A(Edge.) 
(%) 
SAMOT 99.999907 99.999316 99.998802 
Markov 99.999909 99.999332 99.998830 
Case 1: ASC = 0.99 
                       SSC = 0.90 
              ST = 10 sec Discrepancy 0.000002 0.000016 0.000028 
SAMOT 99.999878 99.999278 99.998737 
Markov 99.999880 99.999294 99.998764 
Case 3: ASC = 0.99 
                       SSC = 0.90 
              ST = 30 sec Discrepancy 0.000002 0.000016 0.000027 
SAMOT 99.999832 99.998676 99.997679 
Markov 99.999852 99.998847 99.997979 
Case 3: ASC = 0.99 
                       SSC = 0.80 
              ST = 10 sec Discrepancy 0.000020 0.000171 0.000300 
SAMOT 99.999807 99.998642 99.997621 
Markov 99.999826 99.998812 99.997919 
Case 4: ASC = 0.99 
                       SSC = 0.80 
              ST = 30 sec Discrepancy 0.000019 0.000170 0.000298 
SAMOT 99.999821 99.998597 99.997541 
Markov 99.999796 99.998361 99.997129 
Case 5: ASC = 0.90 
                       SSC = 0.80 
               ST = 10 sec Discrepancy 0.000025 0.000236 0.000412 
SAMOT 99.999798 99.998566 99.997488 
Markov 99.999772 99.998330 99.997074 
Case 6: ASC = 0.90 
                       SSC = 0.80 
               ST = 30 sec Discrepancy 0.000026 0.000236 0.000414 
SAMOT 99.999754 99.998014 99.996520 
Markov 99.999752 99.997988 99.996475 
Case 7: ASC = 0.90 
                       SSC = 0.70 
               ST = 10 sec Discrepancy 0.000002 0.000026 0.000045 
SAMOT 99.999734 99.997988 99.996474 
Markov 99.999730 99.997959 99.996425 
Case 8: ASC = 0.90 
                       SSC = 0.70 
               ST = 30 sec Discrepancy 0.000004 0.000029 0.000049 
Note:   1. Denote: ASC/SSC –Active/Standby Switchover Coverage, ST-Switchover Time 
2. The MTBF numbers for unplanned hardware outage of Soft-S, LAN-S, and Edge are 
respectively 513522, 47574, and 27130 hours. 
3. A(Edge.)(%) is the availability of unplanned outage of Edge Server1 
 
Results in Table 7.6 indicate that the availability value for a 1:1 redundant hardware-
software system derived by the SAMOT tool is extremely accurate, comparing to the 
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 Markov analysis results. Under the above experimental parameter sets, SAMOT just has 
a discrepancy from 0.000002% to 0.00045%. 
 
Sensitivity analysis of the modeling results in Figure 7.10(a) shows that there is little 
difference of results among different switchover time (10 seconds and 30 seconds) and 
only 4 lines are visible, therefore the switchover time does not seem to be a significant 
factor affecting SAMOT’s accuracy.  
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Figures 7.10(a ) & (b). Discrepancy of SAMOT & Markov Modeling Results 
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 Figure 7.10(b) shows that the higher the switchover coverage is, the more accurate the 
SAMOT will be; SAMOT accuracy becomes more sensitive to the switchover coverage 
when the studied system is less reliable (i.e., with a lower MTBF). 
 
7.2.2.3  Network Path Availability 
Table 7.7 is the availability metrics of the paths in the sample network based on the 
above network architecture, system configuration and subsystem availability parameters. 
 
Table 7.7. Availability of Signaling Path and Bearer Path of the Sample Network 
Network Path Annual Downtime (min) A (%) DPM (B) DPM (D) 
Signaling Path 116.15 99.9779 220.98  
Bearer Path 115.47 99.9780  76.60 
Note: The above results are based on Case 1 parameter settings. 
 
 
In general, the SAMOT tool is very accurate when applied on availability modeling and 
analysis for a network comprised of redundant systems with high switchover coverage 
and high system availability. The switchover time between the active and standby 
systems does not seem to be a very significant factor affecting the SAMOT accuracy. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation aims to develop efficient approaches to analyze the reliability and 
availability of networks integrated with link failures, node hardware failure and software 
failures. The research methodologies and results are performed at the system level and 
the network level. It will be the author’s great pleasure that this research has added some 
valuable contributions in the network reliability and availability field: 
 
- An efficient approach - MORIN is proposed and demonstrated. 
- A simplified methodology and modeling tool for solution availability - 
SAMOT is developed and illustrated for modeling the end-to-end availability 
of a network comprised of 1:1 redundant hardware-software systems.  
SAMOT requires the network architecture, system configurations, the MTBF, 
MTTR of subsystems of each system along the path and the redundancy 
availability parameters as inputs. SAMOT results are verified by Markov 
analysis and can be validated by field collected availability data. 
- Petri nets based techniques and efficient modeling tools for parallel and 
concurrent systems are discussed and explored as well.  
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 The major object of the research is s-t two terminal reliability and availability problems.  
MORIN can identify the event trees and find the path and calculate the overall network 
reliability, but short of capturing the scenarios when redundancies are involved in 
complex component systems (nodes) that are subject to software and hardware failures.  
On the other side, the SAMOT models the reliability and availability of complex systems, 
and can also compute the end-to-end solution availability, given the network architecture 
and solution path. The SAMOT Main Module can provide reliability of component 
system to Event_RCal Module of MORIN.   
 
MORIN and SAMOT are very well complementary approaches that integrate into a 
comprehensive solution package for modeling the reliability and availability of complex 
networks.  As illustrated in Figure 8.1, the package addressing the practical problems 
comprises of two segments: the proposed MORIN firstly identifies the disjointed event 
trees and path sets from source node s to sink node t; then the SAMOT is developed to 
solve the path set problem by computing and approximating (with high accuracy) the 
reliability and availability of practical end-to-end solutions consisting of integrated 
hardware-software systems (with redundancies). 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 Event_RCal
MORIN_Events Main_Module
Redundancy_Module
Path Set / Event Tree
H
W
/SW
System
U
nplanned/
Planned
O
utage
Av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
of
R
ed
un
da
nc
y
Path Set / Event Tree
MORIN SAMOT
Re
liab
ility
 of
Co
mp
on
en
t S
yst
em
s
 
Figure 8.1 Complementary Relationship Between MORIN and SAMOT 
 
Follow-up researches can be logically expanded to analyzing the network reliability of k-
terminals and all-terminals. Future researches in reliability and availability analysis for 
integrated networks can also address the different impact on the failure of its incidental 
node from each (category of) software fault. Some extended models would be developed 
based on empirical software failure data. Another research direction is the study of the 
dependency of software failures and hardware failures that cause node failure.  
 
It would be a very rewarding task to extend the SAMOT application to the end-to-end 
path availability of a network with 1:N software-hardware system redundancy. Finally, 
should more resource and efforts be available in applying the special programming 
language and relevant software package, the sketchy PN-based methodologies would 
have been better developed and verified. 
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 Appendix 1 SAMOT Modules 
 
 
Figure A-1.1. SAMOT-Main Module: Solution Architectural Scenarios 
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Figure A-1.2. SMOT-Main Module: End-to-End Availability Worksheet 
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Figure A-1.3. SAMOT-Main Module: Aggregation Device 
 
130 
 Appendix 1. (Continued) 
 
 
 
Figure A-1.4. SAMOT-Main Module: Core Router 
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Figure A-1.5. SAMOT-Main Module: Softswitch System 
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Figure A-1.6. SAMOT-Main Module: LAN Switch 
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Figure A-1.7. SAMOT-Main Module: Edge Server 1 
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Figure A-1.8. SAMOT-1:1 Redundancy Module: SoftSwitch 
 Appendix 1. (Continued)   
 
Figure A-1.9. SAMOT-1:1 Redundancy Module: LAN Switch 
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Figure A-1.10. SAMOT-1:1 Redundancy Module: Edge Server 1 
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 Appendix 2 Markov Analysis Tool 
 
 
Figure A-2.1.  Markov Analysis Summary Demo 
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 Appendix 2. (Continued) 
 
Appendix 2.1.  Markov Analysis Input File 
Input File Name: sample1.txt 
====================== 
# 1:1 Active/Standby Hardware + Software Redundancy 
# Variables: FIT rates, MTTR, coverage factors, switch time 
 
states = 13 
failed = 2,4,5,6,10,11 
 
# Parameters: 
 
MTTFH = 47574     # HW Mean Time To Failure (hr) 
MTTFS = 18039     # SW Mean Time To Failure (hr) 
lambdaH = 1/MTTFH  # HW Failure rate of active unit 
lambdaS = 1/MTTFS  # SW Failure rate of standby unit 
SwitchTimeH = 10   # HW Switchover time to standby (sec) 
SwitchTimeS = 10   # SW Switchover time to standby (sec) 
betaH = 1/(SwitchTimeH/3600) # HW Switchover rate 
betaS = 1/(SwitchTimeS/3600) # SW Switchover rate 
MTTR1H = 10/60/60  # MTTR of HW unit non-service failures (hr) 
MTTR1S = 10/60/60  # MTTR of SW unit non-service failures (hr) 
MTTR2H = 3   # MTTR of HW unit service failures (hr) 
MTTR2S = 2/60   # MTTR of SW unit service failures (hr) 
mu1H = 1/MTTR1H  # Mean HW repair rate for non-service affecting failures 
mu1S = 1/MTTR1S  # Mean SW repair rate for non-service affecting failures 
mu2H = 1/MTTR2H  # Mean HW repair rate for service affecting failures 
mu2S = 1/MTTR2S  # Mean SW repair rate for service affecting failures 
c1 = 0.99   # Coverage factor of active unit 
c2 = 0.90         # Coverage factor of standby unit 
 
# Transitions: 
 
## States for detected failures 
1 2 c1*lambdaH 
2 3 betaH 
3 1 mu1H 
3 4 lambdaH 
4 1 mu2H 
3 5 lambdaS 
5 1 mu2S 
1 6 c1*lambdaS 
6 7 betaS 
7 1 mu1S 
7 4 lambdaH 
7 5 lambdaS 
1 8 c2*lambdaH 
8 1 mu1H 
8 4 lambdaH 
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 Appendix 2. (Continued) 
 
 
8 5 lambdaS 
1 9 c2*lambdaS 
9 1 mu1S 
9 4 lambdaH 
9 5 lambdaS 
 
 
## States for undetected failures 
1 10 (1-c1)*lambdaH 
10 1 mu2H 
1 11 (1-c1)*lambdaS 
11 1 mu2S 
1 12 (1-c2)*lambdaH 
12 4 lambdaH 
12 5 lambdaS 
1 13 (1-c2)*lambdaS 
13 4 lambdaH 
13 5 lambdaS 
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 Appendix 2. (Continued) 
Appendix 2.2.  Markov Analysis Output File 
MARKOV MODEL SOLUTION FOR STEADY STATE AVAILABILITY, (V 2.2) JULY 1986          
            BELL COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH, INC.  
 
MODEL PARAMETERS : 
 
 MTTFH           = 47574 
 MTTFS           = 18039 
 lambdaH         = 2.101988E-005 
 lambdaS         = 5.543545E-005 
 SwitchTimeH  = 10 
 SwitchTimeS = 10 
 betaH           = 360 
 betaS          = 360 
 MTTR1H        = 0.002778 
 MTTR1S          = 0.002778 
 MTTR2H          = 3 
 MTTR2S          = 0.033333 
 mu1H            = 360 
 mu1S            = 360 
 mu2H            = 0.333333 
 mu2S            = 30 
 c1              = 0.99 
 c2              = 0.9 
 
STATE PROBABILITIES : 
 
 STATE PROBABILITY      MINUTES/YR 
 ----- ----------------  ------------ 
 1 0.909084503      4.77815E+005 
 2 5.254934172E-008 0.02762      * FAILED STATE 
 3 5.254933056E-008 0.02762      
 4 5.732678471E-006 3.0131       * FAILED STATE 
 5 1.679856888E-007 0.08829      * FAILED STATE 
 6 1.385876370E-007 0.07284      * FAILED STATE 
 7 1.385876075E-007 0.07284      
 8 4.777211869E-008 0.02511      
 9 1.259887341E-007 0.06622      
 10 5.732655461E-007 0.30131      * FAILED STATE 
 11 1.679850145E-008 0.00883      * FAILED STATE 
 12 0.024993485      13136.57574  
 13 0.065914965      34644.90573  
 
STEADY STATE RELIABILITY MEASURES: 
 
 AVAILABILITY    = 0.9999933181      
 UNAVAILABILITY  = 6.6818651859E-006 
 DOWNTIME        = 3.5119883417        MINUTES PER YEAR 
 MTBF             = 1.4930973523        YEARS 
 FAILURE RATE    = 76455.3302348351    FITS 
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 Appendix 3 MORIN Algorithm 
Here are codes implementing the MORIN reliability calculation. 
 
/* *********************************************************************** * 
 *                                                                  *    
 *   MORIN_RCal.c                                                  *  
 *                                                             *    
*   This program is to to calculate the network reliability based     * 
*   on the reliability of each node and link along the event trees.   * 
 *   This program is designed to run on sunblast.eng.usf.edu        * 
 *                                                                 *     
 *    Code designed and created by W. Hou    * 
 * ********************************************************************** */ 
 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include <iostream.h> 
#include <sys/types.h> 
#include <netdb.h> 
 
#define node_number 4 
#define link_number 5 
 
 
main()  /* calculate network reliability based on generated event trees */ 
 
 
{ 
char  event_tree[]; /* the event tree path sets       */ 
char  node, link;  /* the node index, link index    */ 
char  link;          /* the link index                       */ 
double R_node[];  /* the node reliability               */ 
double RM_node[];  /* the node’s modified reliability   */ 
double RMo_node[];  /* the node’s modified reliability with operational incoming links */ 
double RMf_node[];  /* the node’s modified reliability with failed incoming links  */ 
double R_link[];  /* the link reliability                  */ 
double R_source[]; /* source node reliability          */ 
double R_event_tree[];  /* event tree reliability              */ 
double R  /* overall network reliability     */ 
double Rh_node[];  /* the node hardware reliability                */ 
double Rh_link[]; /* the link hardware reliability                   */ 
double Rh_source[]; /* source node hardware reliability          */ 
double Rs_node[];  /* the node software reliability                */ 
double Rs_source[]; /* source node software reliability           */ 
double R = 1;  /* the initial network reliability    */ 
double RMo_node = 1; /* the initial modified node reliability with 
   operational incoming links  */ 
double RMf_node = 1; /* the initial modified node reliability with failed incoming links */ 
int i, j, k;  /* node j and link k on event tree i            */ 
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 Appendix 3. (Continued) 
 
 
while ((event_tree = getchar()) != EOF) 
 
 for (i = 0; i < event_tree number; ++i )    
 { 
 
for (j = 0; j < node number on the event tree; ++j ) 
 
  { 
  
     for (k = 0; k < adjacent links to node j; ++k) 
  
 if (link[k]_adjacent = OPERATIONAL) 
      RMo_node [j] = R_node[i] * R_link[k]; 
  
 else 
     RMf_node [j] = (1-R_node [j]) + R_node[j] * (1 - R_link[k]) ; 
 
 R_event_tree[i] = R_source * RMo_node [j] * RMf_node [j]; 
} 
 
Printf(“reliability of event tree i is :”, R_event_tree[i]); 
} 
 
R *= R_event_tree[i]; 
  } 
Printf(“overall reliability is :”, R) 
 
} 
 
  
/* codes for ET generating and other modules are available upon NDA  */ 
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